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I. INTRODUCTION 
A United States court must refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign money 
judgment “rendered under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or 
procedures.”1 Though few courts have ever made this finding,2 the systemic 
inadequacy ground has nevertheless received significant attention from 
 
1. Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and the Enforcement 
of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1469 (2011); Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and 
Retaliatory Legislation: The Impact on the Available Alternative Forum Inquiry and on the Desirability of 
Forum Non Conveniens as a Defense Tactic, 56 KAN. L. REV. 609, 635 (2008). 
2. Thomas Kelly, Note, An Unwise and Unmanageable Anachronism: Why the Time Has Come to 
Eliminate Systemic Inadequacy as a Basis for Nonrecognition of Foreign Judgments, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 555, 
559 (2011); Virginia A. Fitt, Note, The Tragedy of Comity: Questioning the American Treatment of Inadequate 
Foreign Courts, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 1021, 1030–32 (2010); see GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, 
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 1154 (5th ed. 2011) (“In general, U.S. courts are 
hesitant to deny the fairness of other countries’ judicial systems.”); Melinda Luthin, U.S. Enforcement of 
Foreign Money Judgments and the Need for Reform, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 111, 134 (2007) 
(“[T]here have been few cases denying recognition of FMJs based on the argument that the judicial system 
failed to provide procedures compatible with due process.”). 
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commentators who attack it for a number of doctrinal and policy reasons. One 
criticism is that these state laws require courts to make foreign policy and to 
answer political questions, thus violating the Constitution.3 Many courts hesitate 
to pass judgment on the judicial system of an entire country,4 except for the most 
politically disfavored, leading to an inconsistent patchwork of authority and a 
lack of applicable standards.5 Further, the systemic inadequacy ground is 
unnecessary because in almost all cases where systemic inadequacy arises, courts 
can base nonrecognition on other, less controversial grounds.6 A growing number 
of states are adopting the 2005 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments 
Recognition Act,7 which adds two grounds for dismissal based upon bias or 
denial of due process in the original proceedings.8 The addition of these grounds 
calls into doubt the need for inquiring into the adequacy of the entire judicial 
system.9 
Several professors, practitioners, and student commentators have addressed 
the doctrinal collision between forum non conveniens (FNC) and the recognition 
and enforcement laws in two high-profile, multi-billion-dollar sets of toxic tort 
litigation.10 The first series of cases are the DBCP pesticide cases involving 
Nicaraguan plaintiffs against fruit company Dole and the chemical 
manufacturers. The second group of cases are the environmental damage suits 
brought by indigenous people of the Lago Agrio region of Ecuador against 
Texaco and its parent company Chevron in Chevron Corp. v. Donziger.11 These 
 
3. Montre D. Carodine, Political Judging: When Due Process Goes International, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1159, 1190–91, 1206 (2007). 
4. Fitt, supra note 2, at 1030–32. 
5. Id. at 1213-14; Kelly, supra note 22, at 570, 579-80; Fitt, supra note 2, at 1030-32; John S. Baker, Jr. 
& Agustin Parise, Conflicts in International Tort Litigation Between U.S. and Latin American Courts, 42 U. 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 18-25 (2010); Saad Gul, Old Rules for a New World? The Constitutional 
Underpinnings of U.S. Foreign Judgment Enforcement Doctrine, 5 APPALACHIAN J.L. 67, 69-70 (2006). 
6. Kelly, supra note 2, at 565, 575. 
7. Karen L. Hart & Marie A. McCrary, Foreign Judgments, 80 U.S.L.W. 1682, n.5 (2012), available at 
http://www.bellnunnally.com/ userfiles/files/KLH%20Getting%20Paid%20Article.pdf (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review).  
8. See UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c) (7)–(8) 13 U.L.A. pt. 2 
(2005) [hereinafter 2005 RECOGNITION ACT]. 
9. Carodine, supra note 33, at 1234–36; see infra, Part III.A (discussing the Uniform Recognition Acts).  
10. See, e.g., Suraj Patel, Delayed Justice: A Case Study of Texaco and the Republic of Ecuador’s 
Operations, Harms, and Possible Redress in the Ecuadorian Amazon, 26 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 71 (2012); Whytock 
& Robertson, supra note 1, at 1484–92; Christina Weston, Comment, The Enforcement Loophole: Judgment-
Recognition Defenses as a Loophole to Corporate Accountability for Conduct Abroad, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
731 (2011); Baker & Parise, supra note 5, passim; Cortelyou Kenney, Comment, Disaster in the Amazon: 
Dodging “Boomerang Suits” in Transnational Human Rights Litigation, 97 CAL. L. REV. 857, 864 (2009); 
Heiser, supra note 1, passim; M. Ryan Casey & Barrett Ristroph, Boomerang Litigation: How Convenient Is 
Forum Non Conveniens in Transnational Litigation? 4 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 21, 21–22 (2007). 
11. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d Chevron Corp. v. Camacho 
Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2012); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d 303 F.3d 
470 (2d Cir. 2002); see Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Trends and 
Out-of-Court Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 BERKELY J. INT’L L. 456, passim (2010); Lucien J. 
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cases were originally filed in the U.S. and were dismissed for FNC to be re-filed 
abroad after a finding that the courts in plaintiffs’ home countries were adequate; 
however, after plaintiffs secured money judgments in their home country, 
defendants have argued U.S. courts should refuse to recognize and enforce the 
judgments because that same foreign court system is inadequate.12 The different 
standards at the FNC and recognition stages have created what Whytock and 
Robertson characterize as an “access-to-justice gap” for the plaintiffs. This 
prompted the call for a number of reforms, including that the systemic 
inadequacy ground be applied differently, if not abolished outright.13 
This last concern with recognition law as applied in recent cases suggests a 
theoretical approach that may yield additional perspectives: rhetoric. Mark D. 
Rosen has argued that the “lack of theoretical sophistication” of the comity 
doctrine, upon which recognition laws are based, prevents principled answers to 
doctrinal questions.14 Rhetorical theory requires that we approach the law not in 
the abstract but in the context of practice, as the interplay between litigants and 
courts and even extending to the social and political context.15 And rhetorical 
theory takes as its object the text, namely the judicial opinion and the legal 
sources upon which it is constructed, though not as a pronouncement of the only 
possible and therefore compelled result, but as a statement which justifies and 
thereby gains adherence to its holding.16 Rhetoricians would look beyond the 
doctrine or policy of the recognition and enforcement laws, beyond what 
defendants argue, and even beyond what trial courts find, and fix their gaze upon 
 
Dhooge, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco: Mandatory Grounds for the Non-Recognition of Foreign judgments for 
Environmental Injury in the United States, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1 (2009) [hereinafter “Dhooge 
Mandatory”]; see also Lucien J. Dhooge, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco: Discretionary Grounds for the Non-
Recognition of Foreign Judgments for Environmental Injury in the United States, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 241 
(2010). Throughout this Article, the common names “Chevron” for Chevron Corporation and “Texaco” for 
Texaco, Inc. will be used.  
12. E.g., Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1449–50; Casey & Ristroph, supra note 10, at 21–22. 
13. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1481; see infra discussion in Part III.B–C. 
14. Mark D. Rosen, Should “Un-American” Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 783, 
856, 870 (2004). 
15. See. e.g., Kirsten K. Davis, Legal Forms as Rhetorical Transaction: Competency in the Context of 
Information and Efficiency, 79 UMKC L. REV. 667, 677 (2011); NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE 
OF LAW: A THEORY OF LEGAL REASONING 6–7 (2005); Francis J. Mootz, Rhetorical Knowledge in Legal 
Practice and Theory, 491 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 491, 582 (1998); James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, 
Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 695 (1985); see Linda 
Levine & Kurt M. Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 108, 114 (1993) (The rhetorical 
conception of law “requires that texts and practices be considered in their cultural context: as purposeful 
utterances and actions taken by particular individuals, directed to particular audiences.”). 
16. E.g., MACCORMICK, supra note 15, passim; Mootz, supra note 15, at 568; Gerald B. Wetlaufer, 
Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545, 1561–62, 1589–90 (1990); Donald H. J. 
Hermann, Legal Reasoning as Argumentation, 12 N. KY. L. REV. 467, 509 (1985); see Jeff Todd, A Rhetoric of 
Warning Defects, 54 SOUTH TEX. L. REV. 343, 347 (2012) (“Rhetoric posits that meaning and power reside in 
the textual relationship.”); KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES xv, xviii (1945) (claiming that his 
system of dramatism is appropriate for studying “legal judgments,” and that “judicial doctrines offer the best 
illustration of the concerns we place under the heading of Grammar”). 
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what appellate courts say—and sometimes, on what they do not say. In both the 
DBCP and Lago Agrio litigation, the Circuit Courts of Appeals have rejected the 
systemic inadequacy findings made by the district courts but have avoided 
addressing those findings.17 
These holdings would seem to be good news for plaintiffs with foreign- 
money judgments and critics who disfavor the systemic inadequacy ground, but 
from a rule of law perspective, these decisions are not good for anybody. While 
rhetoricians reject the notion that there can be only one result in a legal dispute,18 
they nevertheless maintain that legal opinions must be rational and reasonable to 
be accepted as just.19 When appellate courts decline to justify their holdings, or 
when they ignore the established norms of appellate review (applying precedent 
and statutory construction) their opinions are unreasonable.20 Because those 
opinions become precedent, or persuasive authority themselves,21 the lack of a 
sound basis for those decisions creates additional confusion on an issue of law 
already fractured. A rhetorical reading reveals more than an “access-to-justice” 
gap for plaintiffs; it demonstrates how circuit courts deny justice to all parties 
and future litigants and create doubts about the integrity of the judicial system. 
This Article analyzes the systemic inadequacy ground for nonrecognition in 
two recent cases to demonstrate that the appellate opinions are unreasonable 
because they have rejected the ground without addressing it in a rational way. 
Part II summarizes the views of several rhetorical scholars about the judicial 
opinion as emerging from the practice of litigation. Ultimately, opinions are 
accepted as just when the decision-making process is rational and the conclusions 
are supported through a careful analysis of relevant statutes and case-law—and 
unacceptable when the process is irrational and the conclusions unsupported.  
Part III explains the recognition and enforcement law in the U.S., with a focus on 
the systemic inadequacy ground and the scholarly criticisms of it. Part IV 
explicates the recognition proceedings in the DBCP and in the Lago Agrio 
litigation. The Article concludes in Part V that the courts’ avoidance of the 
systemic inadequacy ground relates to the rhetorical context of the proceedings: 
because of the political ramifications of insulting foreign sovereigns, the 
appellate courts avoid addressing the issue. The resulting irony is that the 
appellate courts insult everyone else by ignoring the states’ recognition statutes, 
 
17. See supra notes 8 and 9 and accompanying text.  
18. E.g., Wetlaufer, supra note 16, at 1589–90; Hermann, supra note 16, at 468; Steven D. Smith, 
Rhetoric and Rationality in the Law of Negligence, 69 MINN. L. REV. 277, 293, 298 (1984). 
19. E.g., MACCORMICK, supra note 15, at 12, 16, 104; Smith, supra note 18, at 298.  
20. Wetlaufer, supra note 16, at 1561; see the discussion on rhetoric and the rule of law as articulated by 
MacCormick infra Part.IIC; see also Jeff Todd, Undead Precedent: The Curse of a Holding “Limited to Its 
Facts”, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 67, 72 (2007) (“Courts wish to promote justice and seek to avoid arbitrary 
decisions-making,” and “[a]dhering to precedent fosters the appearance of certainty and impartiality.”). 
21. See Todd, supra note 20, at 72; Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn’t; When 
Do We Kiss It and When Do We Kill It, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 605, 632–33 (1990). 
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twisting the precedent of other courts, rejecting the district court’s well-reasoned 
findings and conclusions, offering inconsistent authority for future litigation, and 
denying justice to the parties by refusing them the rule of law. 
II. RHETORIC AND LAW IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS 
One of the curious ironies of the law, which traces its roots to classical 
rhetoric,22 is that it denies its own rhetoricity. Rather than acknowledge that the 
result of a given case is shaped by multiple competing discourses to arrive at a 
best answer, a judicial opinion pretends to offer the right answer. The reason is 
simple: the rule of law requires rules of law that are clear, intelligible, consistent, 
and predictable for the final and conclusive resolution of disputes. To 
acknowledge that a hard case could go any number of ways—that the relevant 
statutes and precedents admit to multiple interpretations—invites criticism of the 
legitimacy not just of the resolution of the case at hand but of the entire process 
of reaching that decision. 
But a rhetorical critic need not question the legitimacy of the entire legal 
system to engage in the “complex task of legal interpretation” of a particular 
issue.23 A commonplace of the law is that it is always something arguable, not 
something logically certain. Thus, rhetoric, as a method of persuasion that 
incorporates logic, supports the ideal that justice can be afforded through a final 
judgment or appellate opinion so long as those decisions are rational and 
reasonable. When judicial opinions fail to follow the rules of appellate review, 
when they disregard the established norms for interpreting statutes and 
precedents, and when they decline to offer an explanation for their conclusions, 
they deny justice.  They fail to provide the parties with reasons to support the 
finding for or against them, create precedent which injects uncertainty into that 
issue for future litigants and diminish the rule of law and respect for the integrity 
of the legal system. 
A. The Law Emerges from Practice: A Rhetorical Understanding of Justice 
One major modern rhetorician, Chaim Perelman, “elucidate[s] principles of 
justice” for a new rhetoric about how we reason and thence arrive at reasonable 
action.24 His theory “rests on the idea that gaps exist between reason and 
justice.”25 Ambiguity in law arises in four contexts: “when there is no applicable 
 
22. MICHAEL H. FROST, INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC: A LOST HERITAGE 1 (2005). 
23. See Linda L. Berger, Studying and Teaching “Law as Rhetoric”: A Place to Stand, 16 LEGAL 
WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3, 11 (2010). 
24. Mootz, supra note 15, at 514–18; see CHAIM PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF 
ARGUMENT (1963) (collecting Perelman’s essays about law and rhetoric). 
25. Kurt M. Saunders, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Argument, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 566, 572 (1994). 
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rule because the case is one of first impression; when the applicable rule is 
subject to more than one meaning; when an otherwise applicable rule is claimed 
to be invalid; and, finally, when a conflict exists between two potentially 
applicable rules.”26 The resolution of legal problems occurs through informal 
reasoning to arrive at adherence rather than through formal logic to arrive at 
truth; thus, “ambiguity is never entirely avoidable because the language of legal 
argument is always open to multiple interpretations.”27 
Drawing on the rhetoric of Perelman, as well as the hermeneutics of Hans 
Georg Gadamer, Francis J. Mootz advances a rhetorical understanding of justice 
as arising from the context in which litigation occurs.28 He rejects the view of 
legal positivism (as well as the older natural law tradition), which separates the 
social element of legal practice from principles of justice.29 Legal positivism 
distinguishes between theory and practice and between the moral inquiry about 
law and its application through procedure.30 Accordingly, positivists consider the 
“substantive justice of a law . . . only when the law is enacted - or [when] a judge 
[fills] a ‘gap’ in the law.”31 They ignore the rhetorical knowledge that emerges 
from the “myriad argumentative moves made by all concerned over the life of the 
case.”32 
By erecting an artificial barrier, positivists overlook that these interactions, 
whether procedures in court or activities outside it, are “the requirements of 
justice” and thus cannot be separated from the substantive law.33 Mootz contends 
that law cannot be “understood abstractly but only in reference to its application 
to a specific case.”34 Because we can understand justice only through its 
rhetorical context, “[t]he activity of invention is the critical element of legal 
practice.”35 Rather than a fixed target, “justice is a quality of becoming,” a set of 
commonplaces for argumentation to help discussants determine where they stand 
and to impel them forward.36 Mootz therefore rejects justice as a set of pre-given 
substantive rules and instead locates it “in the interstices of the practice of re-
 
26. Id. at 573. 
27. Id. at 572–73; see Hermann, supra note 15, at 471–722 (“This process of argumentation aims not at 
truth but agreement. This is because argument does not lead to a determined solution, but rather acceptable or 
agreed upon conclusions.”). 
28. Mootz, supra note 15, passim; see White, supra note 15, at 695 (“Like law, rhetoric invents; and, like 
law, it invents out of something rather than out of nothing. It always starts in a particular culture and among 
particular people. There is always one speaker addressing others in a particular situation, about concerns that are 
real and important to somebody, and speaking a particular language.”) 
29. Id. at 579.  
30. Id.  
31. Mootz, supra note 15, at 579; Id. 
32. Id. at 575–76, 579. 
33. Id. at 579. 
34. Id. at 577. 
35. Id.  
36. Id. at 580. 
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creating the law and taking appropriate action within the context of an individual 
case.”37 This practice involves not just the litigants, but also “[l]egislators, judges, 
and juries,”38 and it is to the rhetorical role of judges in “re-creating the law” that 
this Article turns. 
B. The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion and the Need for Reasonableness 
Since classical times, rhetoricians have addressed the importance of 
precedent in making legal arguments.39 The topoi, or topics, are lists of recurring 
arguments classical rhetoricians conceived as figurative “places” where 
arguments reside.40 One forensic topic is “previous decisions,” or precedent.41 The 
ancients “compiled a nearly comprehensive catalogue of all the points that 
advocates must consider when making arguments based on precedent.”42 For 
example, Aristotle wrote that “[t]he decision may be on the point at issue, or on a 
point like it, or on the opposite point,” and that it should be widely accepted or 
accepted by the judges in the case at hand.43 The Rhetorica ad Herennium listed 
the ways that citation to precedent might be faulty, such as “if the judgment to an 
unlike matter, or one not in dispute, or is of such a kind that previous decision 
either in  greater number or of greater appropriateness [could] be offered by the 
adversaries.”44 The topoi continue in contemporary practice in the “relatively 
standard ways in which lawyers distinguish and connect cases, broaden and 
narrow precedents, distinguish and construct lines of authority.”45 
Lawyers are not the only ones who engage in precedential manipulation, 
however: “once the judge has decided the case before her, she may assume a role 
as advocate that is in certain respects indistinguishable from the role that was 
played by the lawyers who argued the case.”46 The judge therefore defends her 
position to a variety of audiences—“appellate courts, the legal community, the 
losing party, . . . and the public at large”—that the decision is right and the losing 
 
37. Id. at 580–81. 
38. Id. 
39. FROST, supra note 22, at 1 (2005).  
40. Id. at 27; see J.M. Balkin, A Night in the Topics: The Reason of Legal Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of 
Legal Reason, in LAW’S STORIES; NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 211 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz 
eds., 1996). 
41. FROST, supra note 22, at 28. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. (citing ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC 164–65). 
44. Id. (citing ANONYMOUS, RHETORICA AD HERENNIUM 143). 
45. Balkin, supra note 40, at 219. For Balkin, “[d]octrinal categories and distinctions are topics woven 
into the fabric of the law.” Id. For another classical rhetorical approach to handling precedent that applies 
syllogisms rather than topoi, see Kirsten K. Robbins, Paradigm Lost: Recapturing Classical Rhetoric to 
Validate Legal Reasoning, 27 VT. L. REV. 483 (2003). 
46. Wetlaufer, supra note 16, at 1561. 
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party’s is wrong.47 The irony is that this rhetorical endeavor, this appeal to 
stakeholders in the outcome of the litigation, entails the denial of its own 
rhetoricity.48 Judges downplay the suasory elements of their opinion through 
moves that are themselves rhetorical: assuming an impersonal voice that is 
neutral and objective; making highly rational arguments that take the form of 
deductive, syllogistic proofs; and backing these “by as many authorities as 
circumstances require.”49 Judicial opinions “will almost always be written in a 
tone of impersonality suggesting that the legal materials themselves, rather than 
the personal desires of the judge, required the result in question.”50 Through these 
techniques the judge demonstrates that the right, indeed the inevitable, answer 
has been found.51 
This view, “that there is a determinate correct decision in ‘hard cases,’” 
prevails in law.52 However, legal rhetoricians assume that decisions are 
indeterminate: “there are prior decisions similar or related by analogy to both 
sides of almost any difficult or important issue.”53 As an institutional and social 
matter, the view of one side to the litigation must be accepted as right, such as 
“the correct reading of the statute being interpreted.”54 Legal arguments are not 
the same as philosophical ones, however; rather than aim at truth, legal 
arguments aim at “acceptable or agreed upon conclusions.”55 Because they seek 
agreement through argument, the authority of the decision must be “evaluated by 
the persuasiveness of the reasons given.”56 
From this perspective, the same techniques judges use to show that the case 
was rightly decided also serve the rhetorical purpose of persuading the audience 




48. Mootz, supra note 15, at 567 (“[L]egal practice involves the rhetorical suppression of its 
rhetoricity.”); see Davis, supra note 15, at 676 (“[T]he law does not see itself, and many scholars investigating 
law do not see it, as a product of rhetoric or amenable to rhetorical criticism.”); Berger, supra note 23, at 14 
(2010) (“[O]ne of the most remarkable features of the rhetoric of law is the law’s continuing denial that it is 
rhetoric.”) (emphasis in original). 
49. Wetlaufer, supra note 16, at 1561–62; see Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in 
LAW’S STORIES; NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 187, 188–89, 211 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 
1996) (noting that judicial opinions “will almost always be written in a tone of impersonality, suggesting that 
the legal materials themselves rather than the personal desires of the judge, required the result in question….”). 
50. Levinson, supra note 49, at 188. 
51. Id. at 189; Wetlaufer, supra note 16, at 1562; see id. at 1589 (“[J]udges seek to persuade their 
audiences . . . that the case in question has been fairly heard and rightly decided.”). 
52. Hermann, supra note 16, at 468. (quoting D. Kairys, Legal Reasoning, THE POLICIES OF LAW: A 
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE at 13–14 (1982)).  
53. Id.; see Berger, supra note 23, at 10 (“[R]hetoric reminds us that in ‘hard cases,’ the legal language 
rarely ‘fits’ and the legal rules rarely compel the result.”); Smith, supra note 18, at 298 (“Few cases present an 
‘all or nothing’ situation.”). 
54. Hermann, supra note 16, at 508. 
55. Id. at 472. 
56. Id. at 509. 
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As Dean Mootz writes: 
Ultimately, judicial consideration of the case and issuance of a written 
opinion mark a distinct rhetorical practice shaped by the judge’s effort 
first to persuade herself and then to persuade the parties in the litigation 
and the hypothetical collection of all reasonable lawyers. In some high 
profile cases, the judge might even view the audience of her opinion as 
the citizenry at large.57 
While viewing law as rhetoric rejects the possibility of one right result, it 
nevertheless “reaffirms [the law’s] integrity and legitimacy as a practice of 
securing reasonable adherence.”58 Litigants may not expect a “single, 
unquestionably correct result,” but they “nonetheless value rationality.”59 Gerald 
B. Wetlaufer calls this the problem of legitimacy.60 Decisions that demonstrate 
their impartiality and adherence to statutes and precedent sustain the rule of law 
because they are perceived as “fair, right, and legitimate,” while those that do not 
adhere to precedent diminish the rule of law.61 
C. Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: The Need for Judicial Opinions to 
Demonstrate Predictability and Consistency in the Treatment of Legal 
Sources 
Neil MacCormick also recognized that law is “[the] site of bitter and drawn-
out arguments and disputes,” arguments “cast doubt even on what have hitherto 
seemed law’s most cherished certainties.”62 Yet, certainty in law is not about 
finding absolute truth; rather, the rule of law requires predictability. “[P]re-
announced rules that are clear and intelligible,” offer consistency and coherence 
articulated in “a great body of carefully recorded precedents” so that persons can 
have a framework for their lives.63 Justice requires that current cases should be 
decided like previous, relevant cases. For the legal system to be impartial, it must 
avoid “frivolous variation in the pattern of decision-making from one judge or 
court to another.”64 Justice therefore demands justification: judicial decisions 
must be supported by reasoning stated explicitly in the judicial opinion.65 
 
57. Mootz, supra note 15, at 571. 
58. Id. at 568. 
59. Smith, supra note 18, at 293. 
60. Wetlaufer, supra note 16, at 1561.  
61. Id.  
62. MACCORMICK, supra note 15, at 13. 
63. Id. at 12, 16. 
64. Id. at 143. 
65. Id. at 144. 
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In the process of litigation, the parties present “rival possible meanings” 
about how the law supports their case; the court concludes which is stronger and 
reaches a decision.66 The decision turns on the “understanding of a statutory or 
other binding text.”67 For example, when applying a statute, the court must 
interpret some or all of its terms, plus interpret and evaluate the facts to see “if 
they really fit the statute.”68 MacCormick contends that “[r]easons can and should 
be given for preferred interpretations that are decisive in the case.”69 If the 
statutory provision has been interpreted a certain way by one court in the legal 
system, then it ought to be interpreted the same way by other courts in that 
system.70 “To decide the case and justify [the] decision, . . . reasons should be 
given for the preferred alternative, the preferred line of decision for this and like 
cases.”71 Though the rhetorician recognizes that justification of a decision is not 
always conclusive in favor of one interpretation over another, justifications are 
necessary to show that the ruling is supported by, and does not contradict, 
“established rules of law.”72 
Thus conceived, judicial tools that help achieve consistency like the canons 
of statutory construction and the doctrine of stare decisis reinforce the rhetorical 
soundness of an opinion. For example, they offer individuals certainty in the law 
because they allow “people to rationally order their conduct and affairs.”73 And 
consistency in the application of the law allows courts to “treat similarly situated 
litigants equally.”74 Applying these tools demonstrates to parties, other courts, 
and all readers that the court adheres to “reasoned policy choices.”75 In the words 
of the Supreme Court, stare decisis “permits society to presume that bedrock 
principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and 
thereby contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government, 
both in appearance and in fact.”76 
 
66. Id. at 123. 
67. Id. at 122. 
68. Id. at 42. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 128 “The proposed solution [of] the case, and the legal interpretation which governs it, have to 
be constructed in a manner that shows its consistency with pre-established law according to the [favored] 
interpretation of [the court].” Id. at 53. 
71. Id. at 102–03. 
72. Id. at 104. 
73. Todd, supra note 20, at 70 (quoting Grapevine Excavation, Inc. v. Md. Lloyds, 35 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. 
2000)); see Adam W. Kiracofe, Note, The Codified Canons of Statutory Construction: A Response and 
Proposal to Nicholas Rosenkranz’s Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 84 B.U. L. REV. 571, 574 (2004). 
74. Todd, supra note 20, at 70 (citing Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 369 
(1988)). 
75. See Kiracofe, supra note 73, at 575. 
76. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1986); see Todd, supra note 20, at 71 (quoting Moragne v. 
States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970) (Justice Harlan likewise offered one justification for not 
lightly overruling past decisions is “the necessity of maintaining public faith in the judiciary as a course of 
impersonal and reasoned judgments.”). 
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D. Analyzing Judicial Opinions: Uncovering the Silenced Voices and Hidden 
Ambiguities 
In analyzing judicial opinions, the rhetorician must consider not only how 
judges treat legal sources but also how they obfuscate or avoid them. By 
emphasizing finality, courts minimize or even exclude some voices and therefore 
reject the possibility of a different outcome. James Boyd White writes that 
judicial opinions are too often the “bureaucratic expression of ends-means 
rationality” that tend toward reduction: by focusing on the end result, the opinion 
presents only those means which help attain the end result.77 While the tendency 
in law is to exclude that which does not lead to certainty in results, a rhetorical 
approach to law corrects this reduction by providing terms that bring into “our 
zone of attention and field of discourse what others . . . cut out.”78 By doing so 
the legal rhetorician not only recognizes but embraces the “radical uncertainty of 
most forms of knowledge.”79 Rhetorical criticism therefore begins with the 
questions: “[W]hat voices does the law allow to be heard, what relations does it 
establish among them? With what voice, or voices, does the law itself speak?”80 
In like fashion, Kenneth Burke seeks a multiplicity of perspectives, even 
conflicting ones, to “reveal the strategic spots at which ambiguities necessarily 
arise.”81 Burke calls his rhetorical system dramatism.82 While an analytical 
method based upon a literary genre may seem to have limited utility in a practical 
field like law, Burke like other rhetoricians, situates knowledge as arising from 
human interaction and verbal exchange.83 Drama therefore offers an apt 
metaphor, because it is an art, like other literary genres, constructed of dialogue 
and weighted with symbolism, but one that depends upon performance by flesh-
and-blood actors on a physical stage driving toward some denouement or 
resolution.84 Conceived as drama, litigation is a performance among numerous 
actors that leads to a judgment and perhaps a judicial opinion, where the 
 
77. Davis, supra note 15, at 697, 699. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 697–98. 
81. BURKE, supra note 16, at xviii (emphasis in original);  
82. Id. at xxii; WILLIAM H. RUECKERT, KENNETH BURKE AND THE DRAMA OF HUMAN RELATIONS xv (2d 
ed. 1982) (“[D]ramatism becomes Burke’s final and coherent way of viewing man and the universe.”). 
83. BURKE, supra note 16, at 33 (“Dialectically considered (that is, ‘dramatistically’ considered) men are 
not only in nature. The cultural accretions made possible by the language motive become a ‘second nature’ with 
them. Here again we confront the ambiguities of substance, since symbolic communication is not a merely 
external instrument, but also intrinsic to men as agents.”) (emphasis in original); see Davis, supra note 15, at 
677 (writing that legal rhetoricians conceive of rhetoric as an exploration of the meaning-making process 
through which justice is achieved). 
84. BURKE, supra note 16, at 7 (“Thus, when the curtain rises to disclose a given stage-set, this stage-set 
contains, simultaneously, implicitly, all that the narrative is to draw out as a sequence, explicitly. Or, if you will, 
the stage-set contains the action ambiguously (as regards the norms of action)—and in the course of the play’s 
development this ambiguity is converted into a corresponding articulacy.”) (emphasis in original). 
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ambiguities of all the potential results are eventually given one decisive 
interpretation. Judicial opinions thus direct the attention toward the right result.85 
But in the selection of one reality, the judicial opinion also contains the 
deflection away from other possibilities.86 For Burke, “words are agents of 
power; . . . they are value-laden, ideologically motivated, and morally and 
emotionally weighted instruments of purpose, persuasion, and representation . . . 
.”87 So it is to the words of the judicial opinion itself that the critic must turn88 to 
study and clarify these other possibilities, “the resources of ambiguity.”89 
Judges engage in a number of strategies to avoid deciding cases on the basis 
of controversial moral and political grounds.90 Laura E. Little argues that “judges 
may choose a resolution of the controversy that is less likely to require a change 
in dominant social thinking or to foster especially potent animosity on the part of 
a particular group.”91 Especially when construing legislative and constitutional 
provisions that deal with the court’s power, as with jurisdictional statutes, courts 
avoid candor.92 Some avoidance strategies that remove, reduce or downplay the 
judge’s responsibility for a decision involve word choice and grammatical 
constructions, such as writing in the agentive passive voice or employing 
nominalizations.93 Another way that writers distance themselves from a text is 
abdication to other authority: 
Thus, when a court protests strenuously that its holding is mandated by 
some authority other than itself, one may ask why the court wishes to 
avoid direct responsibility for the ruling. Language pointing to 
responsibility borne by another branch of government—the states, 
Congress, the executive—may of course suggest no more than the 
court’s commitment to judicial restraint or denunciation of the positivist 
 
85. KENNETH BURKE, Terministic Screens, LANGUAGE AS SYMBOLIC ACTION: ESSAYS ON LIFE, 
LITERATURE, AND METHOD 44, 44–46 (1966). 
86. BURKE, supra note 16, at 17 (“[O]ne may deflect attention from scenic matters by situating the 
motives of an act in the agent . . . : or conversely, one may deflect attention from the criticism of personal 
motives by deriving an act or attitude not from traits of the agent from the nature of the situation.”); Delia B. 
Conti, Narrative Theory and the Law: A Rhetorician’s Invitation to the Legal Academy, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 457, 
466 (2001). 
87. GREIG E. HENDERSON, KENNETH BURKE: LITERATURE AND LANGUAGE AS SYMBOLIC ACTION 118 
(1988); see Conti, supra note 86, at 466 ([E]very utterance is an invitation to persuade.”). 
88. BURKE, supra note 16, at xv, xviii–xix, ; see id. at 33 (“[T]he dramatistic analysis of motives has its 
point of departure in the subject of verbal action (in thought, speech, and document).”) (emphasis in original); 
Jeff Todd, Phantom Torts Forum Non Conveniens Blocking Statutes: Irony and Metonym in Nicaraguan 
Special Law 364, 42 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 291, passim (2012) (applying Burke’s master tropes of irony 
and metonymy to analyze judicial opinions that treated forum non conveniens blocking statutes). 
89. BURKE, supra note 16, at xix. 
90. Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction Opinions, 46 
UCLA L. REV. 75, 86 (1998). 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 135. 
93. Id. at 97–98. 
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concept. . . . Or the court may believe that formality and detachment are 
necessary to preserve the appearance of propriety and impartiality. When 
the attempted detachment is pronounced, however, one may conclude 
that the substance of the decision or its likely consequences make the 
court uncomfortable.94 
From an analysis of judicial opinions, Little noted the “pervasiveness of all 
obfuscatory devices.”95 
III. FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS AND THE SYSTEMIC INADEQUACY GROUND 
FOR NONRECOGNITION 
For the prevailing plaintiff in a foreign court, the judgment means success in 
battle, not victory in war. Defendants, even multinational corporations, often 
have no assets in those countries. Plaintiffs must therefore seek recognition and 
enforcement in the court of a country where the defendants have assets. For US 
corporations, this often means a US court.96 While foreign money judgments are 
entitled to a presumption of validity, the law also provides several grounds upon 
which a court can, and in some instances must, deny recognition.97 One of these 
grounds, that the judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide 
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due 
process of law, has come under severe scrutiny by numerous critics. 
A. The (Non)Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments 
1. A Primer on the Recognition Acts 
The Supreme Court addressed the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
money judgments over a century ago in Hilton v. Guyot.98 It referred to comity, 
“the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the . . . judicial 
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and 
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are 
under the protection of its laws.”99 Because comity “is neither a matter of 
absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon 
the other” comity counsels against rejecting the acts of another sovereign’s 
 
94. Id. at 102–03. 
95. Id. at 140. 
96. Weston, supra note 10, at 736. 
97. See Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at 39 (“Foreign judgments are entitled to a strong presumption 
of validity in U.S. courts.”). 
98. 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
99. Id. at 164. 
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courts.100 Yet, this presumes that the foreign proceedings were conducted “under 
a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice” 
and that there is nothing to show prejudice “in the system of laws under which 
[the foreign court] was sitting,” among other considerations.101 If such grounds 
exist, then the foreign judgment might be impeached.102 
Although current recognition law have their basis in Hilton, state law 
controls the recognition and enforcement of foreign money judgements under the 
Erie doctrine.103 Most states have codified the Uniform Foreign Money Judgment 
Recognition Act of 1962 (1962 Recognition Act),104 although a growing number 
of states have adopted the more recent Uniform Foreign-Country Money 
Judgments Recognition Act of 2005 (2005 Recognition Act).105 Those states that 
have adopted neither of the Acts base recognition and enforcement on Hilton and 
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, which, as noted above, are 
substantially similar to the Acts.106 The grounds for nonrecognition (though not 
the case-law interpreting them) are therefore nearly the same in every state, with 
a few variations that will be discussed below.107 
A US court can enter an order requiring the judgment debtor (the defendant 
in the foreign proceedings) to pay the judgment creditor (the plaintiff).108 
However, the Acts apply only to certain types of foreign judgments: those that 
are “final, conclusive, and enforceable.”109 To understand the Acts, we must 
distinguish between recognition and enforcement: enforcement occurs only after 
the judgment is recognized.110 Enforcement means that the “legal procedures of 
the state to ensure that the judgment debtor complies with the judgment are 
 
100. Id. at 163–64; see Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at 39 (“Foreign judgments are entitled to a 
strong presumption of validity in U.S. courts.”). 
101. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202–03. 
102. Id. at 203; see Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1413 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Nations are not 
inexorably bound to enforce judgments obtained in each other’s courts.”). 
103. Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, 24 (citing Erie R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)); 
Heiser, supra note 7, at 634. 
104. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT 13 U.L.A. pt. 2 (1962) 
[hereinafter “1962 RECOGNITION ACT”]. 
105. 2005 RECOGNITION ACT. As of February 2013, thirty-three jurisdictions had enacted either the 1962 
Act or the 2005 Act, with eighteen subsequently enacting legislation based on the latter. An additional state has 
enacted the 2005 Act and another has introduced new legislation based on the 2005 Act. UNIFORM LAW 
COMMISSION, available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/Acts.aspx?title=recognition (last visited Feb. 26, 2013)( 
on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
106. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1464–65; Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 9, at 24 n.143; 
Heiser, supra note 1, at 634–35; see Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164–64. 
107. Heiser, supra note 1, at 634–35.  
108. Id. 
109. Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at 25 (citing 1962 RECOGNITION ACT § 2), 26 (citing 2005 
RECOGNITION ACT § 3(a)(2)). 
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481 cmt. b (“The 
judgment of a foreign state may not be enforced unless it is entitled to recognition.”). 
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available to the judgment creditor to assist in the collection of the judgment.”111 
Courts can enforce any judgment entered by a foreign court that is final—even if 
it is on appeal in the foreign country—and grants money damages rather than 
equitable relief, taxes, fines, or matrimonial support.112 So long as these criteria 
are met, the judgment is conclusive and therefore entitled to the same full faith 
and credit that a U.S. court gives to a judgment entered in a sister state; in other 
words, it is entitled to recognition as though required by the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.113 
In certain circumstances, however, a foreign judgment will be deemed non-
conclusive—or under the 2005 Act non-recognizable—and thus not subject to 
enforcement. Some of the grounds for nonrecognition are mandatory while others 
are discretionary. If the defendant makes a showing under any one of the former, 
the court must make a finding of non-conclusiveness/nonrecognition, but if the 
defendant makes a showing under any of the latter, the court has discretion to 
make that finding.114 The mandatory grounds are the same under both Acts: 
(1) the judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide 
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements 
of due process of law; 
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant; or 
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.115 
The six discretionary grounds from the 1962 Act are essentially the same in 
the 2005 Act: 
(1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive 
notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend; 
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud; 
(3) the [cause of action] . . . on which the judgment is based is repugnant 
to the public policy of this state; 
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment; 
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement 
between the parties under which the dispute in question was to be 
settled otherwise than by proceedings in that court; or 
 
111. 2005 Recognition Act § 3 cmt. 3; Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at 25. 
112. Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at 25. 
113. Baker & Parise, supra note 5, at 36; Heiser, supra note 1, at 635. 
114. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1465–66. 
115. 1962 RECOGNITION ACT § 4(a)(1)-()–(3); 2005 RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(1)-()–(3). 
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(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign 
court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.116 
The 2005 Act adds two discretionary grounds: 
(7) the judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise substantial 
doubt about the integrity of the rendering court with respect to the 
judgment; or 
(8) the specific proceeding in the foreign court leading to the judgment 
was not compatible with the requirements of due process of law.117 
One final factor from Hilton v. Guyot is reciprocity: comity does not require 
enforcement of a foreign judgment if the foreign country would not likewise 
enforce a US judgment.118 Both Acts have rejected reciprocity, but at least eight 
states—including some that have adopted one of the two Acts—have some type 
of reciprocity as a ground.119 
Although judgment debtors seem to have an arsenal of twelve separate 
grounds, most of them are not available in the context of transnational mass tort 
litigation. First, assuming that reciprocity or the lack of integrity and due process 
in the specific proceedings might be at issue, the judgment creditors can avoid 
US states that require reciprocity or that have enacted the 2005 Act.120 They can 
choose to seek recognition in any other state that has personal jurisdiction over 
the judgment debtors and where they have assets, which for multinational 
corporations means many if not every state.121 Even if plaintiffs cannot enforce 
the judgment because the corporation has no assets in that state, plaintiffs can 
still have the judgment recognized by a US court, which makes the judgment 
enforceable under the Full Faith and Credit Clause in any other US state, 
including those where the corporations do have assets.122 
Judgment debtors may try to seek preemptive nonrecognition in the most 
defendant-friendly states. While the plaintiff as judgment creditor typically files 
an action to have the foreign money judgment recognized, judgment debtors in 
several instances have sought injunctions against enforcement.123 One author in 
 
116. 1962 RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(1)-()–(6); see 2005 RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c)(1)-()–(6). 
117. 2005 RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c)(7)-()–(8). 
118. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1464 (citing 159 U.S. at 214). 
119. Id. at 1468–69. 
120. Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at 40; see Baker & Parise, supra note 5, at 18 (“[P]laintiff-
friendly states effectively set the standards for interstate tort litigation.”). 
121. See Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at 40. 
122. Id. at 40; Carodine, supra note 3, at 1242. 
123. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (per 
curiam); Investorshub.com, Inc. v. Mina Mar Group, Inc., Case No. 4:11cv9-RH/WS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
87566 (N.D. Fla. June 20, 2011); Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, No. 04 Civ. 9641(RCC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23423 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2006), aff’d 518 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2008); Shell Oil Co. v. Franco, No. CV 03 8846 NM 
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2007 opined that it is “not clear” whether these actions even come within the 
scope of the Recognition Acts.124 The Recognition Acts do not address 
declaratory judgments, and they define their scope by reference to the 
conclusiveness or recognizability of the foreign money judgment itself.125 Except 
for the Second Circuit in the Lago Agrio litigation discussed infra, no courts have 
tackled the question squarely. The closest may be a plurality of the Ninth Circuit 
sitting en banc in Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, 
in which Yahoo! brought suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA) to have 
a French injunction (not a foreign money judgment) prohibiting it from linking to 
Nazi memorabilia auction sites declared non-recognizable under the public 
policy ground.126 Judge W.A. Fletcher wrote that the 1962 Recognition Act 
adopted by California “is not directly applicable to this case, for it does not 
authorize enforcement of injunctions. But neither does the Uniform Act prevent 
enforcement of injunctions, for its savings clause specifies that the Act does not 
foreclose enforcement of foreign judgments ‘in situations not covered by [the 
Act].’”127 Because the Uniform Act did not apply, he opined that the court should 
“look to general principles of comity” articulated in the Restatement (Third) of 
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.128 Three judges found the issue 
was not ripe and three others that the courts of California lacked personal 
jurisdiction, so by a vote of six-to-five the court reversed the district court’s anti-
enforcement injunction.129 
No court has held that preemptive nonrecognition is forbidden by the 
Recognition Acts. Indeed, judgment debtors in several cases have prevailed as 
plaintiffs against the judgment debtor.130 One oft-cited case is Matusevitch v. 
Telnikoff, where the court found that Telnikoff’s English defamation judgment 
against Matusevitch was not entitled to recognition because it was repugnant to 
the public policies of Maryland and the United States as a matter of law and 
granted summary judgment in favor of Matusevitch.131 A more recent case is 
Investorshub.com, Inc. v. Mina Mar Group, Inc., where the judgment debtor from 
a Canadian defamation action brought an action under the DJA.132 After the 
 
(PJWx), 2005 WL 6184247 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2005); Younis Bros. & Co. v. Cigna Worldwide Ins. Co., 167 
F. Supp. 2d 743, 747 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995); Drake v. Brady, 
No. A08-2137, 2009, Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1049 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2009). 
124. Luthin, supra note 2, at 134. Another article addressing preemptive nonrecognition in 2006 
questioned whether one attempt at preemptive nonrecognition was “the vanguard of a new trend or an 
exceptional kamikaze mission.” Gul, supra note 5, at 97. 
125. Luthin, supra note 2, at 134. 
126. 433 F.3d at 1201–02, 1204. 
127. Id. at 1213 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1713.1(2), 1713.7). 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 1201. 
130. See notes 133–37 and accompanying text.  
131. 877 F. Supp. 1., 2 (D.D.C. 1995).  
132. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87566. 
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parties so stipulated, the district court declared that the case could not be 
enforced in the U.S. pursuant to Florida’s Recognition Act.133 The court in Shell 
Oil Co. v. Franco, a case brought by the judgment debtor under the DJA,134 found 
that the Nicaraguan court in DBCP litigation did not have personal jurisdiction 
over Shell and entered an injunction against enforcement.135 
Even when the judgment creditors have failed in their attempt at preemptive 
nonrecognition, it is for reasons unrelated to the applicability of the Recognition 
Act. For example, in Drake v. Brady, the judgment debtors offered no proof that 
the Canadian court lacked personal jurisdiction over them under Canadian law.136 
In a case affirmed by the Second Circuit, Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, the judgment 
debtor sought a declaratory judgment that an English defamation judgment was 
unenforceable under the New York Recognition Act.137 The trial court found that 
it lacked personal jurisdiction over the judgment creditor, and that finding was 
affirmed.138 Neither court addressed whether the New York Recognition Act 
allowed for, or even applied to, the suit. 
While preemptive recognition seems a smart tactic for judgment debtors in 
transnational toxic tort cases, the lack of personal jurisdiction in Ehrenfeld and 
Yahoo! suggests why they likely will not have an unlimited choice of fora for 
preemptive nonrecognition: no state would have personal jurisdiction over these 
foreign plaintiffs.139 The only exception would be if the foreign judgment resulted 
from an action previously filed in the U.S. but dismissed under FNC. Then, the 
judgment debtor could seek nonrecognition in the state where the plaintiffs first 
filed their US suits. States where the DBCP cases were filed in the 1980s and 
1990s like Texas and Florida, and New York where the Lago Agrio litigation was 
first filed, have not adopted the proceeding-specific grounds for nonrecognition 
in the 2005 Act.140 
Commentators have suggested that many of the other nonrecognition grounds 
do not apply for cases that had previously been dismissed for FNC.141 In an FNC 
proceeding, the court determines which of two fora is more convenient for 
 
133. Id. at *5–7.  
134. 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47557. 
135. Id. at *20. The court in Younis Brothers likewise entered an injunction against enforcing a Liberian 
judgment, but made no reference to a state Recognition Act. 167 F. Supp. 2d at 747. 
136. 2009 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS at *12–13. 
137. Case No. 04 Civ. 9641 (RCC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23423 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2006), aff’d 518 
F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
138. 518 F.3d at 103, 106. 
139. See Luthin, supra note 2, at 135 (“[P]rocedures designed to render [foreign money judgments] 
unenforceable definitely raise issues of whether a court has personal jurisdiction over the judgment creditor.”). 
140. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 36.005; FLA. CODE § 55.605 (West Supp. 2013); N.Y. CODE P. 
L. R. 5304 (Consol. 2013). 
141. Heiser, supra note 1, at 636 (“Most of the provisions of the UFMJRA do not come into play when a 
plaintiff seeks to enforce a foreign judgment rendered after the plaintiff’s action was dismissed by a U.S. court 
based on forum none conveniens.”). 
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litigating the dispute: the US court or the court of a foreign country, often the 
plaintiff’s home.142 To make this determination, a court weighs two sets of 
factors: the private interest factors that deal with the parties’ concerns, like access 
to sources of proof, and the public interest factors that deal with court concerns, 
like the congestion of dockets and the need to apply foreign law.143 Before even 
weighing these factors, however, the court has to ensure that the foreign courts 
are “both available and adequate.”144 The Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft Co. v. 
Reyno considers an alternative forum available if the defendant is amenable to 
process in that jurisdiction.145 This is a low hurdle for defendants, who will have 
consented to personal jurisdiction in the foreign forum; plus, US courts can 
condition dismissal on a return jurisdiction clause if the foreign court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction, thus ruling out the second and third mandatory 
grounds.146 Because the defendant as movant seeks litigation in the foreign forum, 
the defendant cannot argue lack of notice, conflict with another judgment, 
previous settlement, or the serious inconvenience of the foreign forum. 
Accordingly, the only discretionary grounds likely to arise are that the cause of 
action upon which the judgment is based violates the public policy of the state or 
that the judgment was obtained by fraud.147 
2. The Systemic Inadequacy Ground 
The sole mandatory ground that remains is that the judgment was rendered in 
a system that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with 
the requirements of due process.148 The key to this provision is “system.” Judge 
 
142. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506–509 (1947); see Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual 
Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). Because of the removal 
and venue transfer statutes that were enacted after Gilbert and Koster, the doctrine of forum non conveniens in 
federal courts now only applies to lawsuits where one of the litigants is from a foreign country. Martin Davies, 
Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REV. 309, 313 (2002). 
143. The private interest factors are “the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of 
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; 
possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that 
make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508. Another private interest factor 
is the enforceability of any judgment obtained. Id. The public interest factors are administrative difficulties from 
the congestion of court dockets; “the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home”; the  
burden placed on a jury required to decide a case with no connection to the community; and the appropriateness 
of having the dispute tried in a forum familiar with the governing law rather than having another court untangle 
conflicts of law and apply foreign laws. Id. at 508–09. 
144. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 11, at 1456; Heiser, supra note 1, at 614. For a discussion of how 
availability and adequacy are perceived differently in the common law U.S. and the civil law systems of Latin 
American countries, see Alejandro M. Garro, Forum Non Conveniens: “Availability” and “Adequacy” of Latin 
American Fora from a Comparative Perspective, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 65 (2003-04). 
145. Piper, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22. 
146. Heiser, supra note 1, at 614–15.  
147. Id. at 636. 
148. Unif. Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act § 4(b)(2005). 
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Posner in Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden even italicized this word in the Illinois 
Recognition Act to emphasize that the analysis considers only the adequacy of 
the foreign country’s judicial system as a whole rather than impartiality or lack of 
due process in individual proceedings.149 He rejected plaintiffs’ request for an 
inquiry into questionable elements of the specific proceedings, rejecting a “retail 
approach” that would be the equivalent of a “second lawsuit.”150 Other courts 
have followed this interpretation, and it is embraced in the comments to the 2005 
Recognition Act.151 
Walter Heiser divides this ground into two separate questions: whether the 
nation has an impartial judiciary, and whether it provides procedures compatible 
with due process.152 The due process question is difficult for the judgment 
creditor to prove because the foreign proceedings need satisfy only an 
“international standard of due process,” not the rigorous standards required by 
the Due Process clauses of the US Constitution.153 Thus, the foreign procedures 
must be “fundamentally fair” and not offend “basic fairness”;154 the foreign courts 
need not adopt “every jot and tittle” of US due process.155 Courts have affirmed 
basic fairness 
even though the foreign procedure did not include the right to cross-
examine witnesses, prohibited the defendants from raising certain 
defenses and counterclaims, prohibited discovery as to the amount 
claimed by the plaintiff, lacked a verbatim transcript, or conditioned 
leave to defend on the deposit of an amount equal to the prayer in the 
complaint.156 
They have also found that lengthy delays in the foreign legal proceedings do 
not violate due process, nor does international due process require oral testimony 
or compulsory process.157 
Courts only find systemic inadequacy when there is “‘serious injustice’ or 
‘outrageous departure from our own [notion] of civilized jurisprudence,’”158 
 
149. 233 F.3d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 2000). 
150. Id. at 477. 
151. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1467 (citing 2005 RECOGNITION ACT § 4 cmt. 5, U.L.A. pt. 
2, at 27 (Supp. 2011). 
152. Heiser, supra note 1, at 638–39; see Kelly, supra note 2, at 563. 
153. Heiser, supra note 1, at 639–40. Although personal and subject matter jurisdiction are due process 
grounds in U.S. civil procedure, those grounds are treated in separate provisions of the Uniform Acts. Id. at 639. 
As noted above, these grounds are unlikely to be present in a boomerang suit.  
154. Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 476–78; Heiser, supra note 1, at 639–40. 
155. See Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at 41. 
156. Heiser, supra note 1, at 640–41 (citations omitted). 
157. Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at 41–42. 
158. See id. (citing Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 687 (7th Cir. 1987); British 
Midland Airways Ltd. v. Int’l Travel, Inc., 497 F.2d 869, 871 (9th Cir. 1974)). 
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which leads to the second type of systemic inadequacy, impartiality of the 
foreign judiciary. Here, “the appropriate inquiry is whether the judicial system is 
an independent branch of the foreign country’s government and is capable of 
administering, and does in fact administer justice in a fair manner.”159 The U.S. 
court must find that the foreign tribunal is corrupt and biased or incapable of 
acting impartially with respect to the defendant.160 Judge Posner in Ashenden 
suggested that nations “whose adherence to the rule of law and commitment to 
the norm of due process are open to serious question” could be found inadequate, 
such as Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Congo.161 He contrasted those 
countries with the courts of the country at issue before him, England, which he 
characterized as “the very fount from which our system developed; a system 
which has procedures and goals which closely parallel our own.”162 
The entire judicial system of a country has been found inadequate in two 
notable cases. In Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, the bank sued the sister of the 
deposed and exiled Shah of Iran to collect on promissory notes.163 When she 
failed to appear, the court entered a default judgment of $32,000,000 against her, 
and the bank sought recognition and enforcement in California, where Pahlavi 
lived.164 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s granting Pahlavi’s motion for 
summary judgment on the ground that the courts of Iran deny due process: “[t]he 
evidence in this case indicated that Pahlavi could not expect fair treatment from 
the courts of Iran, could not personally appear before those courts, could not 
obtain proper legal representation in Iran, and could not even obtain local 
witnesses on her behalf.”165 The evidence showed that Americans in general, and 
members of the Shah’s family in particular, could not get a fair trial in Iran 
because of strong anti-American sentiments by the Islamist regime that deposed 
the Shah.166 The court listed several facts that supported the trial court’s findings: 
trials are not held in public, they are highly politicized, the regime does not 
believe in an independent judiciary, judges are subject to continuing scrutiny and 
threat of sanction, and unrestrained revolutionary courts can take over civil 
actions.167 
In Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, a Liberian company filed suit against 
Citibank when it liquidated the bank account and paid devalued Liberian dollars 
rather than US dollars because of civil war in that country.168 The company won a 
 
159. Heiser, supra note 1, at 639. 
160. Id. 
161. Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000).  
162. Id. at 476 (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
163. Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir. 1995). 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 1413. 
166. Id. at 1411–13. Indeed, Americans faced physical danger in traveling to Iran. Id. at 1411. 
167. Id. at 1411–12. 
168. 45 F. Supp. 2d 276, 280-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d 201 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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breach of contract lawsuit in Liberian court, which was affirmed by the Liberian 
Supreme Court, and the company sought to enforce in the U.S.169 At the time of 
the Liberian lawsuit, the nation was embroiled in a civil war so that a “bleak 
picture” of the judiciary emerged.170 Rather than follow constitutional procedures, 
factions controlling various parts of the country determined the appointment and 
removal of judges.171 The courts that did exist were barely functioning, 
“hampered by inefficiency and corruption” when they were, and “subject to 
political, social, familial, and financial suasion.”172 This situation continued even 
after the war ended.173 The district court concluded that the judgment was 
unenforceable as a matter of law: “[o]n the record before the Court, a reasonable 
factfinder could only conclude that, at the time the judgment at issue here was 
rendered, the Liberian judicial system was not fair and impartial and did not 
comport with the requirements of due process.”174 The Second Circuit affirmed 
that Citibank was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.175 
US courts consider a wide range of sources in determining systemic 
inadequacy because this consideration is neither a question of fact nor a question 
of law, “but it is a question about the law of a foreign nation, and in answering 
such questions a federal court is not limited to the consideration of evidence that 
would be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence; any relevant material 
or source may be consulted.”176 Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
gives a court broad freedom to consider any relevant material about foreign law, 
including unsworn testimony of the opinion letter of a foreign lawyer, evidence 
from non-lawyers, and judicial notice of the words of foreign statutes.177 Thus, 
courts rely upon expert witnesses, which may include declarations from US 
diplomats to those countries as well as legal scholars and judges from those 
countries.178 Courts also cite legal sources, both US cases and scholarship as well 
as the law of foreign nations, which are often attached to expert reports.179 
Another routine source is the annual Country Reports prepared by the US State 
Department, which includes sections about the effectiveness of the judiciary and 
 
169. Id. at 280–81. 




174. Id. at 287; see N.Y. C. P. L. R. 5304(a) (Consol. 2013) (systemic inadequacy ground). 
175. Bridgeway, 201 F.3d at 142.  
176. Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000).  
177. Davies, supra note 142, at 354–55. 
178. See e.g., Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting declaration of 
Laurence Pope, a State Department official); Bridgeway, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 279 (citing sworn statement of H. 
Varney G. Sherman, a Liberian attorney and former president of the Liberian National Bar Association).  
179. See e.g., Pahlavi, 58 F.3d at 1412 (taking judicial notice of Circuit Court opinions that had found 
that a fair trial in Iran was not possible); S.C. Chimexim S.A. v. Velco Enterprises Ltd., 36 F. Supp. 2d 206, 207 
n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing law review articles about Romania). 
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its susceptibility to bias and politicization.180 Other reports from US governmental 
agencies, as well as the reports of non-governmental organizations and even 
media sources detailing the history and politics of the country, are also 
considered.181 
For example, the Second Circuit in Bridgeway found that Citibank “ha[d] 
come forward with sufficiently powerful and un-contradicted documentary 
evidence describing the chaos within the Liberian judicial system during the 
period of interest to this case to have met [its] burdens and to be entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”182 Citibank had relied upon two sources: affidavits 
of H. Varney G. Sherman, Citibank’s Liberian counsel, and several years’ of the 
US State Department Country Reports for Liberia.183 The court did not address 
the admissibility of the affidavit because it was not contested; it did note that 
Sherman’s description of the courts as being subject to political influence 
supported the district court’s conclusions.184 The court also found the Country 
Reports admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), which permits 
“factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority 
granted by law.”185 The court finally rejected Bridgeway’s objection to the district 
court’s taking judicial notice of historical facts drawn from sources like an 
encyclopedia and CNN news reports, finding that they “were merely background 
history.”186 
B. Criticisms of the Systemic Inadequacy Ground 
1. It Violates the Constitution by Requiring Courts to Engage in Acts of 
State and to Answer Political Questions 
Montre Carodine offers a forceful argument against the systemic inadequacy 
ground: it violates the separation of powers under the Constitution because 
applying an international standard for due process forces courts to make foreign 
 
180. E.g., Pahlavi, 58 F.3d at 1411–12; Bridgeway, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 280; see Dhooge Mandatory, supra 
note 9, at 44. To access the Country Reports, see U.S. Dep’t of State, Human Rights Reports, available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/ (last accessed Feb. 26, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
181. E.g., Pahlavi, 58 F.3d at 1411 (citing consular information sheets that gave travel warnings from 
1981 through 1993 and warned of anti-American sentiments); Bridgeway, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 278 n.2 (taking 
judicial notice of online materials such as CNN News Reports and the Encarta Multimedia Encyclopedia entry 
for Liberia); S. C. Chimexim, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 207 n.2 (citing Judicial Overview of Central and Eastern Europe 
by the American Bar Association Central and East European Law Initiative (CEELI) (1996)); Daniel N. Nelson, 
Romania, ENCARTA MULTIMEDIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (Microsoft 1997); see Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at 
44–45. 
182. Bridgeway, 201 F.3d at 141–42. 
183. Id. at 142. 
184. Id. at 142 n.3 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 482 cmt. b (1987)). 
185. Id. at 143–44 (citing Pahlavi, 58 F.3d at 1411). 
186. Id. at 144. 
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policy.187 First, she likens this ground to the state statute in Zschernig v. Miller 
that the Supreme Court struck down “‘as an intrusion by the State into the field 
of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the 
Congress.’”188 That statute prohibited foreigners from inheriting property without 
engaging in an analysis of the inheritance rights in the foreign country.189 The 
Supreme Court found that the statute made “unavoidable judicial criticism of 
nations established on a more authoritarian basis than our own,”190 and held such 
foreign policy-making by states is prohibited.191 The systemic inadequacy ground 
for nonrecognition is another state statute requiring state courts to make their 
own foreign policy, so Carodine concludes that it too violates the act of state 
doctrine.192 
For federal courts with diversity jurisdiction, the systemic inadequacy ground 
also violates the political question doctrine.193 This is a judicially created doctrine 
of restraint also rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution: courts 
will decline to consider questions that are better left to the political branches.194 
The Supreme Court has held that questions of foreign relations are inherently 
political and therefore best left to the Executive and Legislative branches.195 
2. It Lacks Coherent Standards of Applicability 
While problematic from a doctrinal perspective, the presence of political 
questions also creates problems in application because courts hesitate to find 
systemic inadequacy except for the most politically disfavored or geopolitically 
insignificant countries.196 Andreas Lowenfeld has noted that “judges might also 
be reluctant to label an entire country as unfair,” offering the example of the 
 
187. Carodine, supra note 3, at 1163–64, 1190–91. 
188. Id. at 1192 (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968)). 
189. 389 U.S. at 430–31. 
190. Id. at 440. 
191. Carodine, supra note 3, at 1193. 
192. Id. at 1195; see Kelly, supra note 2, at 580–81; American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 
424-25 (2003) (striking down California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act as interfering with 
President’s conduct of foreign affairs). 
193. Carodine, supra note 3, at 1206. 
194. Id. at 1195–96, 98. 
195. Id. at 1197; see Gul, supra note 5, at 79 (“Particularly problematic is that Hilton comity principles 
force U.S. courts to make political judgments about foreign nations and their treatment of U.S. citizens. These 
decisions might be more appropriately left to the political branches.”). 
196. Kelly, supra note 2, at 579–80 (claiming that courts find systemic inadequacy on in “‘avowed 
enemies’” of the US like Iran or “countries of limited geopolitical significance” like Liberia and Nicaragua); 
Fitt, supra note 2, at 1031 (“American courts have occasionally refused to enforce foreign judgments on the 
grounds of bias or corruption, but such action is typically reserved for only the most chaotic and unjust 
systems.”); see In re Arbitration between Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine, 
311 F.3d 488, 499 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[Courts] have been reluctant to find foreign courts ‘corrupt’ or biased.’”). 
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Ukraine as a hard call but Iran as an easy one.197 This latter example suggests that, 
rather than engage in meaningful analysis, judges might play on stereotypes for 
some countries.198 For countries at the margins, however, courts “seem to bend 
over backward” to avoid a finding of systemic inadequacy.199 Carodine suggests 
that courts might even reward countries that are trying to reform their judiciary to 
be more like the United States.200 
Not all courts break upon the lines of political alignment. The Third Circuit 
in In Sik Choi v. Hyung Soo Kim applied New Jersey law and found that 
procedures in South Korea—not North Korea from Judge Posner’s list of bad 
countries—did not comport with due process.201 Choi obtained an order of 
execution on a promissory note against Kim, who was abroad at the time.202 The 
Third Circuit assumed without deciding that the order of execution was a foreign 
money judgment.203 It then analyzed the specific notice provisions of South 
Korean law to find that they did not allow Kim to have notice and an opportunity 
to be heard.204 The concurring judge would have affirmed the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment on an alternate basis: Choi’s order was not a judgment 
subject to recognition and enforcement.205 
That a court can refuse to recognize a judgment obtained in US-friendly 
South Korea, and on the basis that one law rather than the entire judicial system 
violates international standards for due process, demonstrates how the systemic 
inadequacy ground requires judges to determine lack of due process “without 
giving them a concrete standard for doing so.”206 While scholars note that the 
recognition laws are remarkably consistent,207 they nevertheless recognize 
problems in a system based on a “patchwork of recommended practices, 
restatements, and both state and federal case law.”208 The systemic inadequacy 
 
197. Carodine, supra note 3, at 1213 (citing Discussion of Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments: Analysis and Proposed Federal Statute, 82 A.L.I. PROC. 94 (2005)). 
198. Id. at 1214; see Kelly, supra note 2, at 557 (“In fact, sweeping generalizations about the judicial 
systems of foreign nations are not just allowed under current U.S. law, they are required.”). 
199. Gul, supra note 5, at 82 (“To their credit, state courts seem cognizant of the special implications of 
actions seeking to enforce foreign judgments, and seem to bend over backward to avoid parochialism.”). 
200. Carodine, supra note 3, at 1217–20 (discussing S.C. Chimexim, 36 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)) 
(praising Romania for its reform efforts without assessing the fairness of the judiciary). 
201. 50 F.3d 244, 248, 250 (3d Cir. 1995). 
202. Id. at 246. 
203. Id. at 248. 
204. Id. at 248–50. 
205. Id. at 250 (Lewis, J., concurring). 
206. Kelly, supra note 2, at 570; Luthin, supra note 2, at 119 (characterizing the language of the 1962 
Recognition Act as “confusing and ambiguous. . . .”). 
207. Heiser, supra note 1, at 634–35. 
208. Gul, supra note 5, at 69–70; see Baker & Parise, supra note 5, at 18; Luthin, supra note 2, at 120 
(“These issues have created several layers of non-uniform state law language, implementation, and application 
in recognizing and enforcing FMJs.”).  
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ground in particular “has rarely been interpreted, applied, or questioned,”209 so 
even looking at extra-jurisdictional cases, courts have few opinions upon which 
to rely for guidance.210 The approach is often piece-meal and tailored rather than 
coherent and predictable.211 One student commentator wrote, “[d]espite the word 
‘uniform’ in the statutes’ titles, their enforcement [by US courts] is anything 
but.”212 Saad Gul has characterized the recognition laws in general as offering 
“somewhat misty standards of substantial justice.”213 
3. It Is Often Unnecessary 
Besides lacking a concrete standard, the systemic inadequacy ground is often 
unnecessary because courts can rely upon an alternative basis for nonrecognition 
in almost all cases where there is also systemic inadequacy.214 In fact, “judges 
have chosen to hinge nonrecognition upon less controversial bases such as lack 
of jurisdiction, fraud, or the public policy exception.”215 The 2005 Recognition 
Act, which a growing number of states have adopted, minimizes the need for the 
systemic inadequacy ground by providing two grounds based upon bias or lack of 
due process in the specific proceedings as opposed to the entire judicial system.216 
4. Its Interplay with FNC Creates an “Access-to-Justice” Gap 
One final criticism addressed by numerous commentators involves the 
application of the systemic inadequacy ground to foreign judgments that had 
their genesis in US courts—or similar cases brought against the same corporate 
defendants—where the cases were dismissed for FNC. The basic approach to an 
FNC determination was described in Part II(B)(2), supra, and a detailed 
explication of FNC is beyond the scope of this Article—and has been quite 
extensively treated by a number of scholars.217 Accordingly, this subsection 
 
209. Kelly, supra note 2, at 559. 
210. See Luthin, supra note 2, at 134 (“Indeed, there have been few cases denying recognition of FMJs 
based on the argument that the judicial system failed to provide procedures compatible with due process.”). 
211. Gul, supra note 5, at 85; but see Luthin, supra note 2, at 134 (“[T]his may be one of the few areas of 
constitutional implications arising from the enforcement of FMJs that appears to be uniform.”). 
212. Luthin, supra note 2, at 136. 
213. Gul, supra note 5, at 73; see Fitt, supra note 2, at 1041 (“[F]oreign court recipients of American 
judicial deference should, at a minimum, be free from systemic bias or corruption. Yet the current formulation 
of forum non covneniens and the parallel enforcement of foreign judgments are not adequately designed to 
create such assurances.”). 
214. Kelly, supra note 2, at 575. 
215. Id. at 565. 
216. Carodine, supra note 3, at 1234–36; Kelly, supra note 2, at 565. 
217. See e.g., Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. 
REV. 1081 (2010); Martin Davies, supra note 142, passim. 
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analyzes an issue that is considered in both FNC and enforcement proceedings: 
the adequacy of the foreign court. 
Before balancing the private and public interest factors as part of the FNC 
analysis, the court must first find that the foreign country’s courts are available 
and adequate.218 Adequacy presents a low hurdle for defendants because the 
standards for adequacy are lenient, plaintiff-focused, and ex ante.219 The 
defendant need merely prove that the parties will not be deprived of some 
remedy nor be treated unfairly.220 The Court in Piper Aircraft held that the 
possibility of a change in substantive law that is unfavorable for the plaintiffs 
“should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the 
forum non conveniens inquiry.”221 An unfavorable change in law “may be given 
substantial weight” only if the remedy provided “is no remedy at all.”222 A 
foreign court must be “‘adequate’ enough to provide plaintiffs with a meaningful 
remedy, or at least a remedy that is not clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory.”223 
Accordingly, while a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the foreign court 
makes dismissal inappropriate, the likelihood of smaller damage awards and of 
fewer—and more difficult to prove—theories of liability does not.224 Based on the 
Piper Aircraft standard, courts have rejected the arguments of plaintiffs that, 
unlike the US, their home countries did not have strict liability or punitive 
damages, did not provide for jury trials, and did not allow contingency fee 
contracts.225 They likewise rejected arguments about the foreign country’s 
inability to handle complex cases, both because of laws geared toward the 
resolution of individual disputes and because of the lack of financial resources.226 
Of relevance to future attempts to recognize and enforce a foreign money 
judgment, plaintiffs argued that the foreign courts were inadequate because they 
were corrupt and politicized.227 At the time the DBCP and Lago Agrio defendants 
argued for an FNC dismissal, and therefore “praised” the foreign judiciaries as 
adequate, “courts in those countries were known to be corrupt.”228 A number of 
 
218. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1456; Heiser, supra note 1, at 614.  
219. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1456–60. 
220. Davies, supra note 142, at 319–20; see Whytock and Robertson, supra note 1, at 1456–60. 
221. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 247 (1981). 
222. Piper, 454 U.S. at 254. 
223. Garro, supra note 144, at 65. 
224. Piper, 454 U.S. at 254–55, 255 n.22. In a an action based upon an aircraft crash that killed several 
people, the Court held that the courts of Scotland were adequate even though Scotland does not recognize strict 
liability and limits the type of recovery for wrongful death. Id. at 240, 254–55. By way of contrast, the Court 
cited Phoenix Canada Oil Co. Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., where the district court refused to dismiss because it was 
unclear whether Ecuadoran courts would hear the case and because Ecuador offered no remedy for the unjust 
enrichment and tort claims asserted. Id. at 254–255 n.22 (citing 78 F.R.D. 445 (Del. 1978)). 
225. E.g., Todd, supra note 88, at 300–03. 
226. E.g., id. at 302–03. 
227. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1457. 
228. Baker & Parise, supra note 5, at 10–11; see id. at 13 (“Many of Latin America’s judiciaries have 
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factors contributed to this, such as low pay for judges and the possibility of the 
judge’s removal at the political whim of the executive. A complaint directed at 
courts and judges in many Latin American countries in the 1980s was corruption, 
“‘political intervention, the failure to protect basic human rights and outright 
collusion with authoritarian governments.’”229 The two countries at issue in this 
Article, Nicaragua and Ecuador, “rank among the judiciaries with the most 
corruption.”230 Both Nicaragua and Ecuador “are among a group of countries 
where corruption has worsened as populist regimes politicized the judiciaries.”231 
Especially in highly publicized cases in which the government has a stake, the 
judiciary in countries like Ecuador and Nicaragua “are vulnerable to the pressure 
exerted by the Executive branch.”232 
Despite reports by scholars, the US State Department, various non-
governmental organizations, and the mass media of judicial corruption and 
politicization, US courts hesitated to declare the judicial systems of other 
countries inadequate. They either refused to inquire into these aspects of the 
judiciary, or they applied only minimal scrutiny to ascertain whether corruption 
would preclude fair proceedings for the individual plaintiffs, thereby rejecting 
general accusations of corruption.233 For example, in Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 
Judge Sim Lake downplayed plaintiffs’ affidavit and media reports about a 
political dispute between the President and legislature of Nicaragua over the 
appointment of Nicaraguan Supreme Court justices because that dispute had been 
resolved and did not demonstrate a problem with the trial courts.234 In the Lago 
Agrio plaintiffs’ first attempt at a US trial, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., Judge Jed 
Rakoff rejected plaintiffs’ expert affidavit and Country Reports about Ecuador 
because they contained “broad, conclusory assertions as to the relative 
corruptibility or incorruptibility of the Ecuadorian courts, with scant reference to 
specifics, evidence, or application to the instant cases.”235 
 
long had reputations among their own citizens as corrupt and subject to political influence.”); Whytock & 
Robertson, supra note 1, at 1485 (“In the Dole case, the plaintiffs agreed that the Nicaraguan judiciary was 
highly politicized, but emphasized that the defendants had certainly known about the issue at the time it sought 
to dismiss the case in favor of a Nicaraguan forum.”); Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at 44–46 (noting that 
even though U.S. courts in the Aguinda litigation had concerns as far back as 2000, the representations of 
Texaco “were sufficient to convince two U.S. courts to dismiss the litigation…”); see also Fitt, supra note 2, at 
1038 (“stating that “[q]uantitative evidence has also confirmed” corruption in many Latin American countries). 
229. Baker & Parise, supra note 5, at 13 (quoting Linn Hammergren, Fighting Judicial Corruption: A 
Comparative Perspective from Latin America, in Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption in Judicial 
Systems 138 (2007), available at www.transparency.org/publication/gcr/gcr2007). 
230. Id. 
231. Id. 
232. Garro, supra note 144, at 84–85. 
233. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1458–59; Heiser, supra note 1, at 616: Davies, supra note 
142, at 354–56 (writing how courts are entitled to rely upon a broad range of sources in the FNC analysis). 
234. 890 F. Supp. at 1357. 
235. 142 F. Supp. 2d at 538, 544–45. 
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With a low threshold for proving availability and adequacy, and with the 
public and private interest factors leaning toward the foreign country, courts 
routinely granted dismissal.236 Dismissal was outcome determinative in 
defendant’s favor, with cases sometimes not even refiled, and settlements only a 
fraction of what they would have been in the U.S.237 This started to change 
around the turn of the century. The foreign countries passed retaliatory 
legislation.238 Some statutes, including those enacted in both Nicaragua and 
Ecuador, empowered the courts to entertain the tort cases brought by their 
citizens by including choice-of-law provisions that provided US-style procedural 
and evidentiary mechanisms, added strict liability, and increased damages to a 
level comparable to recoveries in the U.S.239 In addition to these retaliatory 
statutes, “a growing number of countries are recognizing aggregate litigation and 
moving away from prohibitions on contingency fee arrangements and punitive 
damages. . . .”240 Also, there has been an increasing availability of third-party 
litigation financing.241 
Plaintiffs who had originally filed in the U.S. but had their cases dismissed 
for trial in their home countries are now returning—sometimes to the same court 
that entered dismissal—for recognition and enforcement of judgments.242 They 
find that the exact same evidence that they offered to show systemic corruption 
and politicization, which the US courts held was irrelevant in the decision to 
dismiss for FNC, has now become determinative in the decision not to recognize 
and enforce their judgments.243 The fact that the same court relying upon the same 
evidence can reach a different conclusion about adequacy is not inconsistent. In 
contrast to FNC, the systemic inadequacy standard for recognition and 
enforcement is “stricter, defendant-focused, and ex-post.”244 According to many 
commentators, however, consistency does not equal justice; in fact, the 
interaction of these two doctrines violates the principle of corrective justice that 
 
236. Heiser, supra note 1, at 619. 
237. Todd, supra note 88, at 304; Winston Anderson, Forum Non Conveniens Checkmated?—The 
Emergence of Retaliatory Legislation, 10 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 183, 184 (2000); see Baker & Parise, 
supra note 5, at 9 (“The eventual enforcement of a foreign judgment was always a possibility implicit in the 
dismissals for FNC, but that result rarely occurred.”). 
238. Baker & Parise, supra note 5, at 5–6.  
239. Todd, supra note 88, at 307–10; Baker & Parise, supra note 5, at 5–6; Heiser, supra note 1, at 622, 
628–34; Drimmer & Lamoree, supra note 11, at 502–03. See generally Garro, supra note 144; Anderson, supra 
note 237. 
240. Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New Multipolarity in Transnational 
Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments, and Foreign Law, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 31, 35 (2011) (citing 
Mark A. Behrens, Gregory L. Fowler & Silvia Kim, Global Litigation Trends, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 165, 
193–94 (2009)). 
241. Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Impact of Third-Party Financing on Transnational Litigation, 44 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 159, 161 (2011). 
227. Casey & Ristroph, supra note 10, at 21–22. 
243. Id. 
244. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1449–50. 
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for every violation of a right, there must be a remedy.245 Countries that are not 
dictatorships but that have a judiciary dominated by the legislative or executive 
branches (including many Latin American countries) offer enough due process to 
dismiss for FNC but not enough to enforce judgments.246 Critics have 
characterized the result of this collision between two different standards as a 
loophole for defendants and as an “access-to-justice” gap for plaintiffs.247 
C. Proposed Solutions for the Systemic Inadequacy Ground 
For cases that had previously been dismissed from the U.S., many 
commentators have recommended changes to the FNC analysis to avoid the need 
for enforcement and the potential for nonrecognition.248 Changing FNC will not 
answer the multi-billion-dollar question, though, which is what to do about 
foreign money judgments already awarded, such as to the judgment debtors in 
the DBCP and Lago Agrio cases. Changes to FNC will have a declining impact 
because the last several years have seen fewer alienage filings in US federal 
district courts, and a corresponding increase in judgment debtors seeking 
recognition of their foreign money judgments in the U.S.249 
At the enforcement stage of cases previously dismissed from the U.S., 
another suggestion is to judicially estop the judgment debtors from challenging 
systemic inadequacy.250 This suggestion suffers from several shortcomings, 
particularly with the Nicaraguan cases that proceeded pursuant to retaliatory 
legislation that was enacted after the cases were dismissed from the U.S.251 Nor 
 
245. Id. at 1482. 
246. Casey & Ristroph, supra note 10, at 46–47. 
247. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1481; Casey & Ristroph, supra note 10, at 44; see generally 
Weston, supra note 7. Other criticisms include the costs and lack of efficiency for multiple proceedings instead 
of a single trial; the lack of finality because of the potential for decades-long litigation; reliance on the part of 
plaintiffs that defendants will recognize the adequacy of the foreign forum; the lessening of tort liability as a 
deterrent to harmful conduct; and harm to comity and international relations. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 
1, at 1482–91. 
248. Robertson, supra note 207, at 1087 (federal legislation and treaties); Kenney, supra note 7, at 865 
(more aggressive dismissal conditions on defendants); Baker & Parise, supra note 5, at 30–31 (apply the law of 
the foreign forum in the US proceedings). But see Jennifer L. Woulfe, Note, Where Forum Non Conveniens and 
Preemptive Jurisdiction Collide: An Analytical Look at Latin American Preemptive Jurisdiction Laws in the 
United States, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 171 (2010) (advocating that courts retain current FNC standards). 
249. Quintanilla & Whytock, supra note 224, at 33–37 (detailing the decline in alienage filings in US 
federal courts in the 1990s and 2000s and concurrent increase in actions for the enforcement of foreign money 
judgments in the Southern District of New York); see also Casey & Ristroph, supra note 10, at 51 (“As 
plaintiffs achieve victories in Latin American courts, more judgment enforcement cases are likely to find their 
way to U.S. courts.”). 
250. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1500–01; Heiser, supra note 1, at 641–42. 
251. E.g., Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1500-01; Heiser, supra note 1, at 660–61; see id. at 
641–42 (writing that judicial estoppel protects the integrity of the courts and the judicial process by preventing a 
party who has successfully asserted a position in a prior legal proceeding from taking a contrary position in a 
later proceeding). 
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should equitable relief be available for plaintiffs who themselves and through 
their attorneys had a hand in drafting and procuring that retaliatory legislation, 
and who have taken an active role in applying political pressure to the foreign 
courts.252 Plus, as noted above, an increasing number of foreign plaintiffs are 
turning first to their own courts, so estoppel would not apply to their attempts to 
enforce. 
While one obvious solution would seem to be legislation at the federal level 
to unify recognition and enforcement practice, that option is not available for a 
host of Constitutional reasons. Further, treaty negotiations have failed to result in 
an international standard for recognition and enforcement that could override 
state law.253 However, the systemic inadequacy ground may be unlawful under 
the United States Constitution because of the separation of powers, so some 
commentators propose eliminating the ground altogether.254 The 2005 
Recognition Act, which a growing number of states have enacted, added two 
discretionary grounds for nonrecognition if the specific proceedings in the 
foreign country denied due process or were tainted by judicial corruption.255 Not 
only does this inquiry provide a more focused standard, it also vitiates the need 
for an amorphous systemic inadequacy inquiry.256 
Because recognition and enforcement are a patchwork of state laws, the 
states’ legislatures may not outright repeal this ground; nevertheless, the courts 
and other governmental entities can minimize it. The courts could more readily 
apply the act of state and political question doctrines to abstain from considering 
the ground altogether.257 Additionally, the US Department of State could remove 
the political question from the courts by creating an authoritative list of the 
countries it believes have corrupt judiciaries that deny due process, making the 
determination an easy call.258 
 
252. Drimmer & Lamoree, supra note 11, at 489–512 (detailing how plaintiffs and their attorneys in the 
DBCP and Lago Agrio litigation have met ex parte with judges, enlisted the aid of the executive branch, staged 
mass protests in the capital cities, and helped to draft and enact the retaliatory legislation); see, e.g., James F. 
Flanagan, Confrontation, Equity, and the Minamed Exception for “Forfeiture” by Wrongdoing, 14 WM. & 
MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1193, 1243 (2006) (“The equitable maxims of ‘unclean hands,’ ‘equity favors the 
vigilant,’ and ‘he who seeks equity must do equity,’ all focus on the movant’s role and may disqualify him from 
relief if his conduct was responsible for the harm.”). 
253. See generally Gul, supra note 5. 
254. Carodine, supra note 3, at 1165; Kelly, supra note 2, at 582. 
255. Carodine, supra note 3, at 1233–36. 
256. Id.; see Kelly, supra note 2, at 576–77. 
257. Carodine, supra note 3, at 1190–91; Kelly, supra note 2, at 582. 
258. See Carodine, supra note 3, at 1165; Kelly, supra note 2, at 582 (recommending that the US State 
Department could make its Country Reports less reliable as evidence by including disclaimers in them). 
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IV. SYSTEMIC INADEQUACY AS APPLIED: THE DBCP AND LAGO AGRIO 
LITIGATION AND THE AVOIDANCE OF THIS GROUND 
Mootz writes that “law is never understood abstractly but only in reference to 
its application to a specific case.”259 Accordingly, this Article turns to the 
systemic inadequacy ground as it has been applied in two recent cases, which 
have received considerable attention from scholars who theorize that systemic 
inadequacy unfairly denies plaintiffs access to justice. An analysis of the cases 
proves that this ground has had no impact on the recognition of the DBCP or 
Lago Agrio judgments. There has been a lack of justice, however, because the 
circuit courts have rejected the district court’s application of this ground, but 
have done so without sound reasons.260 The appellate courts have either ignored 
their own standards and precedent, or have twisted the readings of cases and 
statutes.261 
A. DBCP Litigation and Attempted Enforcement of a Nicaraguan Judgment in 
Osorio v. Dole Food Company 
1. Background on DBCP Litigation in the 1980s and 1990s 
Scholars, the mass media, and the director of not one but two films have told 
and retold the story of DBCP litigation for over twenty years.262 It begins with the 
nematode, a worm so small one needs a microscope to see it. It attacks the roots 
of crops and causes significant damage.263 DBCP is the active ingredient in 
 
259. Mootz, supra note 13, at 577. 
260. See Parts IV.A.3–4 and IV.B.3-4 
261. Id. 
262. This author published an article on this topic twenty years after one of his law school professors 
published the first. Compare Todd, supra note 88, with Alex Wilson Albright, In Personam Jurisdiction: A 
Confused and Inappropriate Substitute for Forum Non Convemens, 71 TEX. L. REV. 351 (1992). DBCP 
litigation in Los Angeles County made the front page of the Wall Street Journal a few years ago, continuing a 
trend started in the mid-1990s in the New York Times. Steve Stecklow, Fraud by Trial Lawyers Taints Wave of 
Pesticide Lawsuits, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 19, 2009), http://online.wsj. com/article/SB125061508138 
340501.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Diana Jean Schemo, U.S. Pesticide Kills Foreign Fruit 
Pickers’ Hopes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/06/ world/us-pesticide-kills-
foreign-fruit-pickers-hopes.html. (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). For an analysis of the perceptions of 
plaintiffs in media coverage about DBCP litigation, see Anne Bloom, “Milking the Cash Cow” and Other 
Stories: Media Coverage of Transnational Workers’ Rights Litigation, 30 VT. L. REV. 179, 190–196 (2006). 
Fredrick Gertten directed the documentary Bananas!* that covered the trial in Tellez v. Dole Food Co., No. BC 
312852 (L.A. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2008). See BANANAS!*, http://www. bananasthemovie.com (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). Dole sued Gertten for defamation after the film was screened at the Los Angeles Film 
Festival, but then dismissed the suit. Drimmer & Lamoree, supra note 11, at 492–93, 493 n.193. Gertten has 
subsequently made another documentary about that defamation lawsuit, Big Boys Gone Bananas!*.; BIG BOYS 
GONE BANANAS!*, http://www.bigboysgonebananas.com (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).; 
263. Sharon Frey, Comment, DBCP: A Lesson in Groundwater Management, 5 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 81, 81 (1985). 
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nematocides that controlled the pest effectively and resulted in larger crop 
yields.264 DBCP was used on a variety of crops throughout the world, but its use 
on banana farms in the Philippines, West Africa, and Latin America—in 
particular, Nicaragua in the 1970s—generated the most lawsuits.265 After the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency canceled the registration for DBCP in 1979 
because significant exposure to the chemical can cause sterility in men, foreign 
field workers started filing lawsuits in the United States against the 
manufacturers of the pesticide and the major fruit companies that had contracted 
with the farms where they worked.266 
As the example of Delgado shows, these lawsuits did not make it far in the 
U.S. because they were routinely dismissed on FNC grounds.267 For many of 
these lawsuits, dismissal was outcome determinative; many actions were never 
refiled in the home country, and even those that were did not make it to trial.268 At 
best, plaintiffs could settle their claims, but only for a fraction of what they could 
have received in U.S. litigation.269 Several Latin American countries responded 
with blocking statutes, some of which were specifically enacted in response to 
DBCP litigation. Nicaragua’s blocking statute, Special Law 364, caused the 
largest impact.270 Plaintiffs’ lawyers, in conjunction with a “union” of banana 
farm workers affected by DBCP, helped draft Special Law 364 and then lobbied 
the Nicaraguan legislature to pass it.271 It aimed to coerce defendants into not 
seeking an FNC dismissal through the irony of proclaiming the courts of 
Nicaragua open to DBCP litigation—but with conditions so onerous that no 
defendant would choose Nicaragua over the U.S.272 Among other provisions, this 
retroactive law required the posting of millions of dollars of bonds to litigate; it 
made strict liability available by creating an irrefutable presumption of causation 
for any plaintiff who could show exposure and sterility; it curtailed proceedings 
so that defendants had only three days to answer the complaint and eight days for 
 
264. See id. 
265. Todd, supra note 88, at 297–98 
266. Id. at 298; see, e.g., Delgado, 231 F.3d 165 at 165, 169–170; Dow Chemical Co. v. Alfaro, 786 
S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. 1990) (stating that Costa Rican plaintiffs asserted claims against Dow and Shell); Sibaja 
v. Dow Chemical Co., 757 F. 2d 1215, 1216 (11th Cir. 1985) (same). 
267. Todd, supra 88, at 300; see also 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1335 (1995). 
252. See Todd, supra note 88, at 304; Dante Figueroa, Conflicts of Jurisdiction Between the United States 
and Latin America in the Context of Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 119, 
153 (2005). 
269. Id.; Anderson, supra note 248, at 184.  
270. The formal title of Special Law 364 is Special Law for the Conduct of Lawsuits Filed by Persons 
Affected by the Use of Pesticides Manufactured with a DBCP Base. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1353–55, app. I. 
An English translation of Special Law 364 is attached as an appendix in Osorio. Id., 
271. Drimmer & Lamoree, supra note 11, at 490.  
272. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1325 (citing Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin America 
and Blocking Statutes, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 21, 24 (2003–04)). 
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discovery; and it established a schedule of damages, with $100,000 U.S. as the 
minimum.273 
While one purpose was to prevent lawsuits pending in the U.S. from being 
dismissed to Nicaragua, Special Law 364 had provisions that nevertheless 
encouraged new plaintiffs to file claims in Nicaragua, which they did. Within a 
few years of passage, 7,000 plaintiffs filed over four hundred cases.274 By 2009, 
Nicaraguan courts had rendered thirty-two judgments totaling over $2 billion, 
with claims for billions more pending.275 Because those defendants no longer 
have assets in Nicaragua, the plaintiffs sought to recognize and enforce one of 
those judgments in the U.S., including one proceeding where the courts 
considered the systemic inadequacy ground: Osorio v. Dole Food Co.276 Two 
hundred and one plaintiffs filed the underlying lawsuit in Osorio pursuant to 
Special Law 364 in February 2002 in Chinandega, Nicaragua.277 The plaintiffs 
asserted that, during their work on Dole-contracted banana farms in the 1970s, 
they were exposed to DBCP manufactured by Dow, Shell, and Occidental.278 In 
2005, the trial court entered judgment in favor of 150 of the 201 plaintiffs, 
awarding a total of $97.4 million, or an average award of $647, 000.279 
2. The District Court Denies Enforcement 
The prevailing plaintiffs sought recognition in the Circuit Court of Miami-
Dade County in August 2007, but the defendants removed to the Federal District 
Court for the Southern District of Florida.280 Florida’s Recognition Act tracks the 
1962 Act except that it includes reciprocity and has a separate provision for 
defamation actions.281  
 
273. Id. at 1353–55; see also Heiser, supra note 1, at 631–33. 
274. Todd, supra note 88, at 331–12; see also Heiser, supra note 1, at 633 (“[T]he provisions that remove 
financial barriers to suit by plaintiffs in Nicaragua by authorizing free legal assistance and waiver of costs, as 
well as the provisions dealing with causation and damages, appear designed to encourage Nicaraguan plaintiffs 
to commence their lawsuits in the Nicaraguan courts.”). 
275. Todd, supra note 8, at 312. 
276. 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307; see id. at 1312 (“Dole used DBCP on its banana farms in Nicaragua until the 
farms were expropriated by the Sandinista regime that came to power in 1979.”) Another group of Nicaraguan 
judgment creditors had sought recognition and enforcement in California of a $489.4 million judgment rendered 
under Special Law 364, but recognition was denied on other grounds, so no trial or appellate court addressed 
systemic inadequacy. Franco v. The Dow Chemical Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26639, Case No. CV 03-5094 
NM (PJWx) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2003); Shell Oil Co. v. Franco, 2005 WL 6184247, No. CV 03 8846 NM at *2 
(PJWx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2005).  
277. 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1318. None of the plaintiffs were parties to the Delgado litigation.  
278. Id. at 1311–12. Judge Huck had earlier dismissed Occidental and Shell from the lawsuit because 
they were not subject to personal jurisdiction in Nicaragua. Id. at 1311 n.1. 
279. Id. 
280. Id. at 1321.  
281. FLA. STAT. § 55.605 (West 2006). 
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The remaining judgment debtors, Dole and Dow, argued that the court should 
not enforce the judgment because: 
(1) the Nicaraguan trial court lacked personal and subject matter 
jurisdiction over the Defendants, (2) the underlying judgment was 
rendered under a system which does not provide procedures compatible 
with the international concept of due process of law, (3) the cause of 
action or claim of relief on which the judgment is based is repugnant to 
the public policy of the State of Florida, and (4) the judgment was 
rendered under a system without impartial tribunals.282 
In their first argument, the defendants combined two different mandatory 
grounds for nonrecognition, the lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction, 
into one.283 They approached the systemic inadequacy grounds similarly to 
Professor Heiser’s interpretation of it as two separate considerations, with 
argument (2) relating to due process and argument (4) relating to corruption and 
politicization.284 The remaining argument, that the “cause of action or claim for 
relief on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this 
state,” is one of the discretionary grounds.285 After considering the evidence, 
including a four-day hearing in which “[b]oth sides submitted substantial expert 
testimony and documentary evidence. . . on the Nicaraguan judicial system, 
Special Law 364, and the specific Nicaraguan trial proceedings in this case,” 
Judge Huck found for Dole and Dow on all four grounds.286 
He treated each argument in turn. Of importance to personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction, Special Law 364 requires the posting of a bond as a 
“procedural prerequisite for being able to take part in the lawsuit,” and if 
defendants do not do so within ninety days, they “must subject themselves 
unconditionally to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States of 
America.”287 The Supreme Court of Nicaragua affirmed the constitutionality of 
this provision because it gave defendants the right to opt out of litigation in 
Nicaragua and instead choose a U.S. forum.288 Because both Dole and Dow had 
refused to post the bond, Judge Huck found that the defendants had “effectively 
 
282. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1321. Shell and Occidental had already been granted summary judgment 
because they were not subject to personal jurisdiction in Nicaragua. Osorio v. Dole Food Co., No. 07-22693-
CIV, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 713 at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2009). 
283. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1321; see also FLA. STAT. § 55.605(1)(b)–(c).  
284. Id. § 55.605(1)(a); Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1321; see also Heiser, supra note 1, at 638–39.  
285. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1321; FLA. STAT. § 55.605(2)(c). Dole and Dow also asserted that the 
judgment was obtained by fraud, but the trial court bifurcated the proceedings and reserved the fraud ground for 
a later hearing if necessary. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1312, n.3; see FLA. STAT. § 55.605(2)(b). 
286. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1321–22. 
287. Id. at 1326. 
288. Consultation to the Judges of the Supreme Court of Justice of Nicaragua, 53 (Nicar. Oct. 16, 2003). 
A complete translation of the opinion is available in the Appendix to Saint Dahl, supra note 272, at 53–57. 
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invoked their opt-out rights,” which divested the trial court of both personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction and mandated nonrecognition under Section 
55.605(1)(b)–(c).289 Judge Huck devoted a significant portion of his analysis to 
the due process aspect of Section 55.605(1)(a).290 Rather than look at whether the 
Nicaraguan judiciary as a whole provides procedures that are fundamentally fair, 
the court evaluated only the provisions of Special Law 364, the only theory of 
liability upon which the underlying judgment was based.291 After summarizing 
the medical and scientific evidence about DBCP and sterility, Judge Huck 
concluded that “the international due process norms described in Ashenden do 
not permit awarding damages, especially of the magnitude awarded here, without 
proof of causation.”292 He also examined the other provisions of Special Law 364 
and concluded that, both on their face and as applied by the Nicaraguan trial 
court, they unfairly targeted certain foreign defendants and thereby denied them 
due process.293 The court limited its analysis of the public policy ground “to 
Defendants’ challenges to the portions of Special Law 364 which the Court has 
already concluded are inconsistent with the international concept of due 
process.”294 For the same reasons that these provisions failed to comport with the 
international standard, they deprived defendants of due process under Florida’s 
Constitution, thus supporting nonrecognition under the discretionary ground of 
section 55.605(2)(c).295 
The court concluded by analyzing the impartiality of the Nicaraguan 
judiciary, the other consideration for mandatory nonrecognition under section 
55.605(1)(a).296 The court relied upon the United States Department of State 
Country Reports from 1999 through 2008, which “have concluded that Nicaragua 
lacks an effective civil law system.”297 Osorio was filed in Nicaragua in 2002, and 
that same year the State Department concluded that “‘[j]udge’s political 
sympathies, acceptance of bribes, or influence from political leaders reportedly 
often influenced judicial actions and findings.”298 And in 2005, the year that the 
Osorio judgment was issued, the State Department suggested that the situation 
had deteriorated because they used the same language from 2002 but dropped the 
“reportedly.”299 The court turned to other sources that seconded the Country 
 
289. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1326 (citing FLA. STAT. § 55.605(1)(b)–(c)). 
290. See generally Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307.  
291. Id. at 1343. 
292. Id. at 1335. 
293. Id. at 1335–43. 
294. Id. at 1345. 
295. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without 
due process of law . . . .”), § 21 (“[J]ustice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.”)), id. at 1347. 
296. Id. at 1347–48. 
297. Id. at 1348. 
298. Id. 
299. Id. 
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Reports, like the reports of non-governmental organizations, to find “that the 
unanimous view among United States government organizations and officials 
(including United States ambassadors to Nicaragua), foreign governments, 
international organizations, and credible Nicaraguan authorities, is that the 
judicial branch in Nicaragua is dominated by political forces and, in general, does 
not dispense impartial justice.”300 
The court found that two of defendants’ experts on the Nicaraguan judiciary 
were well-qualified and their testimony was especially credible. The first was 
Omar Garcia-Bolivar, a Latin American specialist who served as part of the 
United States Agency for International Development’s assessment process under 
the Central American Free Trade Agreement. The second was Gabriel Antonio 
Alvarez Arguello, a Nicaraguan lawyer and law professor.301 Garcia-Bolivar 
testified that politicians regularly determined the outcome of trials and that lower 
court judges are subject to the political whim of Supreme Court justices, who run 
their judicial districts like “fiefdoms.”302 Professor Alvarez testified that, while 
the formal structure of the judiciary is respectable on paper, “in practice its 
decisions are commonly driven by partisan interests.”303 Plaintiffs’ experts did not 
rebut the conclusions of these experts and the other independent evidence of 
corruption and politicization.304 
Like the judiciary of Liberia, which was described in Bridgeway, the 
judiciary of Nicaragua ignored the national constitution, and “‘corruption and 
incompetent handling of cases were prevalent.’”305 Consistent with the approach 
of other courts, the court based its conclusion on “the operation of the 
Nicaraguan judicial system as a whole, and not the particulars of this case.”306 
The court nevertheless called Special Law 364 and its application to the case 
“Exhibit A evidencing the lack of independent tribunals in Nicaragua.”307 
The passage of Special Law 364 is itself evidence of political interference in 
Nicaragua’s judicial process. The law requires judges to enforce a set of 
procedures that the Nicaraguan Attorney General found were unconstitutional; 
indeed, the Nicaraguan Supreme Court upheld Special Law 364 only because the 
defendants could voluntarily exempt themselves from it.308 
Based on the mandatory grounds, Judge Huck concluded that “the judgment 
is not considered conclusive, and cannot be enforced under the Florida 
 
300. Id. at 1348–49. 
301. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1349–50. 
302. Id. at 1349. 
303. Id. at 1350. 
304. Id. 
305. Id. at 1349 (citing 45 F. Supp. 2d at 287). 
306. Id. at 1351. 
307. Id. at 1351. 
308. Id. 
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Recognition Act.”309 He likewise declined to enforce the judgment on the public 
policy ground, and ordered that the judgment “be neither recognized nor 
enforced.”310 
3. The Eleventh Circuit Affirms—Except for the Holding on Systemic 
Inadequacy 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
finding that the Nicaraguan judgment was not entitled to recognition and 
enforcement. 311 It did so only on the grounds of lack of personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction, lack of due process, and repugnance to the public policy of 
Florida.312 The Eleventh Circuit wrote that “we do not address the broader issue 
of whether Nicaragua as a whole ‘does not provide impartial tribunals’ and 
decline to adopt the district court’s holding on that question.”313 
4. Rhetorical Analysis of the Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion—Or, More 
Precisely, What the Court Does Not Say 
The brevity of the above summary suggests the shortcoming of the Eleventh 
Circuit’s opinion: that quote constitutes the extent of the Court’s writing on this 
point.314 To paraphrase James Boyd White, judges tend to exclude that which 
does not lead to certainty in results, so the rhetorical critic asks what voices were 
silenced.315 Here, those voices were other judicial opinions, even those of the 
Eleventh Circuit. The court did not cite any authority to justify its refusal to 
affirm this ground, not even a standard of review—indeed, it offered no 
explanation or rationale at all. 316 Yet rhetoricians measure the justice of an 
opinion by the explicit justifications in that opinion: the judge needs to 
demonstrate how the holding is supported by established rules of law and that it 
does not contradict them.317 The Eleventh Circuit’s reversal of the systemic 
inadequacy finding is inconsistent with other authority because the legal 
interpretations and factual findings made by Judge Huck comport with the 
leading cases and the scholarly comment on the systemic inadequacy ground.318 
To maintain its preferred holding, the court therefore had to ignore authority 
 
309. Id. at 1352. 
310. Id. 
311. Osorio v. Dow Chemical Co., 635 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 2011). 
312. Id. at 1278–79. 
313. Id. at 1279. 
314. Id. 
315. See White, supra note 15, at 695.  
316. See id.; Osorio, 635 F.3d at 1279. 
317. See, e.g., Mootz, supra note 15, at 571. 
318. See supra Part III.A.2.  
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because all of it is to the contrary.319 Instead of offering persuasive reasons, the 
court relied upon its position of power to force the holding.320 Even though the 
judgment was affirmed because of the other three grounds, the court’s refusal to 
cite and adhere to authority calls into question the legitimacy of the opinion and 
thereby diminishes the rule of law.321 
The Eleventh Circuit does not identify the error or errors of the trial court.322 
Was there an error of law? Of fact? Both? After all, the systemic inadequacy 
inquiry involves considerations of both law and fact.323 Nor does the court even 
articulate a standard of review, particularly one that allows it to reject a trial 
court’s holding without addressing why.324 The parties and anyone who reads the 
opinion are left to speculate. So let us engage in that speculation and take as our 
starting point the standards of review in the Eleventh Circuit. The Circuit Court 
of Appeals reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and 
applies the same legal standards that controlled the district court’s decision.325 
Accordingly, the court reviews the district court’s interpretation and application 
of the law de novo.326 That the court declined to adopt Judge Huck’s “holding” 
suggests an error of law.327 An analysis of his opinion shows that there was no 
such error.328 
Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts apply the law of the state in which 
they sit to determine whether to recognize and enforce a foreign money 
judgment.329 Judge Huck applied the Florida Recognition Act, including its 
provision mandating as inconclusive a judgment rendered under a system with 
impartial tribunals. 330 Because it cited to the Florida Recognition Act provisions 
in affirming the findings about lack of due process, lack of personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction, and violation of public policy, the Eleventh Circuit must 
agree that Judge Huck applied the correct statutory law.331 
Perhaps the legal error was in splitting this first ground into two different 
considerations. Courts and scholars, including Professor Heiser (to whom Judge 
 
319. The one exception would be if it had cited either act of state or political question doctrine as raised 
by Carodine, see discussion accompanying notes 174–182, supra, but that would have entailed taking a risk as 
opposed to playing it safe. See infra Part V. 
320. Osorio, 635 F.3d at 1279. 
321. See discussion accompanying supra notes 56–61, 
322. Osorio, 635 F.3d at 1279. 
323. See Soc’y of Lloyds, 233 F.3d at 477. 
324. Osorio, 635 F.3d at 1279. 
325. Billings v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 459 F.3d 1088, 1092 (11th Cir. 2006). 
326. Holton v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 425 F.3d 1325, 1336 (11th Cir. 2005). 
327. Osorio, 635 F.3d, at 1279. 
328. See generally 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
329. See, e.g., Dhooge Mandatory, supra note 11, at 265 n.129. 
330. Osorio, 635 F.3d, at 1322–23 (citing FLA. STAT. § 55.605). 
331. Id. at 1278 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 55.605). 
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Huck cites), approach this ground the same way.332 When it listed the “four 
independent grounds for nonrecognition under the Act,” the Eleventh Circuit 
easily could have pointed out that two of them should have been treated as one.333 
This error would be harmless, however, because the plain language of the Florida 
Recognition Act itself allows for two considerations: “a system which does not 
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of 
due process of law.”334 That Judge Huck treated these considerations in separate 
places in the opinion seems irrelevant. 
A more serious legal error might be his interpretation of what a “system with 
impartial tribunals” means under the Florida Recognition Act.335 No Florida 
opinions have interpreted this ground. Judge Huck cited only one opinion, 
Bridgeway, and characterized the ground as mandating generalizations about the 
Nicaraguan judiciary as a whole.336 That interpretation was articulated in 
Ashenden, has been followed by numerous courts, and is recognized by 
scholars.337 Maybe the Eleventh Circuit desired a break with other courts and 
thought that the standard should be more focused on impartiality in the particular 
proceedings. Nothing in Florida case law suggests that its Recognition Act 
should be interpreted differently than other jurisdictions’ Recognition Acts. In 
fact, at least one Florida court cited the Recognition Act of another state and 
characterized it as “the same.”338 Even so, Judge Huck did actually address 
impartiality in the particular proceedings.339 
Another possible legal error relates to the sources of proof relied upon to 
establish the impartiality of the Nicaraguan judiciary. Judge Huck cited the 
written and oral opinions of two experts, who themselves attached numerous 
legal and media sources. He also cited the U.S. State Department Country 
Reports on Nicaragua as well as the reports of other organizations.340 These are 
the types of sources that other federal courts have cited in addressing systemic 
inadequacy, and such sources are specifically allowed under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 44.1 and Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C).341 
 
332. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Franco, Case No. CV 03-8846 NM (PJWx), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31125 
at *2, *17 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2004) (considering California’s section 1713(a)(1) in a motion for summary 
judgment), which mirrors Florida’s section 55.605(1)(a), as a claim for lack of impartial tribunals and a claim 
for lack of due process; Heiser, supra note 1, at 638–39; Kelly, supra note 2, at 563; Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 
1325 (citing Heiser, supra note 1, at 622–23). 
333. Osorio, 635 F.3d at 1278. 
334. FLA. STAT. § 55.605(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
335. See Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1349. 
336. Id. (citing 45 F. Supp. 2d at 287). 
337. See discussion accompanying supra notes 138–140. 
338. Israel v. Flick Mortg. Investors, Inc., 23 So. 3d 1196, 1198 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2008) 
(citing the Texas Recognition Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 36.001–008). 
339. Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1351. 
340. Id. at 1348–50. 
341. See supra notes 163-173; see also Franco, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31125 at *13–14 (in motion to 
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Rather than the types of sources, the error might be the sufficiency of those 
sources to support the conclusion of systemic inadequacy. Of course, this is more 
speculation because the court did not detail the evidence relevant to the point or 
explain how—or even if—the finding was factually insufficient.342 The Eleventh 
Circuit reviews findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard.343 “The law is 
well settled that ‘[i]f the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in 
light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it 
even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have 
weighed the evidence differently.’”344 Even if the evidence conflicts, the appellate 
court may not reverse.345 Indeed, where the court credited the testimony of one of 
two or more witnesses who told equally coherent and plausible stories, that 
finding “can virtually never be clear error.”346 Under this deferential standard, the 
appellate court could not have found error. Judge Huck had the opinions of two 
experts, themselves supported by numerous legal and media sources, about 
impartiality in Nicaragua.347 Plaintiffs too brought forward expert testimony, 
which he considered but rejected.348 Multiple years’ Country Reports, bolstered 
by the reports of other entities, supported judicial politicization and corruption 
during the years that Osorio was tried in Nicaragua.349 This equals, if not exceeds, 
the volume of information considered by federal courts that have found a system 
of impartial tribunals in the foreign country.350 
Rather than persuade through reason, the Eleventh Circuit relied upon its 
power in the federal judicial hierarchy to gain adherence. The opinion was not 
authored and signed by a single judge, but was instead per curiam, which is the 
corporate “we” of the entire court. Only an appellate court can issue an opinion 
that speaks with the voice of the entire court—but then it should do so only when 
the matter is clear.351 The opinion therefore enjoys its authority through force 
rather than through persuasion, because the Eleventh Circuit did not have to 
justify itself to the inferior court, which has no basis to question the negation of 
 
dismiss, referring to statements by US Ambassador to Nicaragua and in US State Department reports about 
bribery, corruption, and politicization of the judiciary in Nicaragua). 
342. See 5 AM. JUR. 2D APPELLATE REVIEW § 773. 
343. Billings, 459 F.3d at 1092 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)). 
344. Holton, 425 F.3d at 1354 (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)). 
345. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573. 
346. Id. at 575. 
347. Id. at 1349–50. 
348. Id. at 1350–51. 
349. Id. at 1348–50. 
350. See, e.g., Bridgeway, 201 F.3d at 141–42 (affirming finding based upon affidavits of one person and 
several years’ worth of US State Department Country Reports that Liberia lacked a system that provided 
impartial tribunals). 
351. Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 409 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Per curiam is a Latin phrase 
meaning ‘[b]y the court’, which should distinguish an opinion of the whole Court from an opinion written by 
any one Justice. . . . Such an opinion does not speak for the entire Court on a matter so clear that the Court can 
and should speak with one voice.”). 
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its findings of fact and conclusions of law.352 Because the judgment was affirmed 
on two other mandatory grounds and one discretionary ground, plaintiffs had 
reason to seek Supreme Court review only on those three, and Dole had no 
reason to challenge the rejected holding.353 
B. Lago Agrio Litigation and Chevron’s Suit to Have an Ecuadoran Judgment 
Declared Unenforceable 
As with the tale of DBCP litigation, scholars, the mass media, and even one 
filmmaker have chronicled the Lago Agrio saga.354 Based on the sheer volume of 
judicial opinions alone, the Second Circuit wrote, “The story of the conflict 
between Chevron and residents of the Lago Agrio region of the Ecuadorian 
Amazon must be among the most extensively told in the history of the American 
federal judiciary.”355 The attempts to tell the story have become part of the 
litigation itself, with Chevron gaining access to over six hundred hours of 
outtakes from the movie Crude, outtakes that formed part of the basis for the 
district court to enter a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the $17.2 
billion Ecuadorean judgment.356 In vacating the injunction, the Second Circuit 
ignored these outtakes, and all of the evidence submitted by Chevron, and the 
other cases on point, and instead relied upon an unprincipled reading of New 
York’s Recognition Act to hold that equitable relief was not an option.357 
  
 
352. See Levinson, supra note 49, at 195. 
353. Osorio v. Dow Chem. Co., 132 S. Ct. 1045 (2012) (denying plaintiffs’ petition for writ of certiorari). 
354. One could potentially write a lengthy bibliography just on Aguinda and Donziger, but a good 
example of the scholarly interest in this litigation is Dhooge, who published separate articles on the potential 
nonrecognition based the mandatory and on the discretionary grounds. See generally Dhooge Mandatory, supra 
note 11 (citing the most recent scholarship on this topic). This litigation has been featured in two general 
interest magazines. Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 9, 2012), 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/01/09/120109fa_fact_keefe (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review); William Langewiesche, Jungle Law, VANITY FAIR (May 2007), http://www.vanityfair. com/politics/ 
features/2007/05/texaco200705 (last visited Feb. 28, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Joe 
Berlinger directed the documentary Crude, which focuses on plaintiffs’ attorneys, Stephen Donziger and Pablo 
Fajardo, and their involvement in the proceedings in Ecuador. The movie streams on Netflix, and the production 
notes for the movie are online. Production Notes, CRUDE, available at http://www.crudethemovie.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2009/08/CRUDE-Press-Kit-081909.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Id.; 
Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 236. 
355. Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 234. 
356. Id. at 236–37. For one commentator’s discussion of the filmmaker’s privilege relating to Chevron’s 
discovery proceedings under 28 U.S.C.§ 1782, see Tom Isler, Comment, Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger and the 
Future of the Journalists’ Privilege for Documentary Filmmakers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 865 (2012). 
357. Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 239, 246. 
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1. Background: Texaco’s Operations in Ecuador, Plaintiffs’ Failed Attempt 
at a US Lawsuit, and Their Success in Ecuadoran Courts 
Texaco Petroleum Company (TexPet), a subsidiary of Texaco, began oil 
exploration in Ecuador in 1964, and in 1965 it started a petroleum concession for 
a consortium that it owned in equal shares with Gulf Coil Corporation. 358The 
consortium eventually came to include the Republic of Ecuador itself, which 
through its state-owned oil company Petroecuador acquired Gulf’s interests in 
1974.359 In 1990, Petroecuador assumed TexPet’s operation of a trans-Ecuadoran 
oil pipeline and drilling activities.360 TexPet relinquished its interests in the 
consortium two years later, leaving Petroecuador as the sole owner and 
operator.361 
As discussed above, plaintiffs brought a putative class action in the Southern 
District of New York in 1993, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.,362 and alleged that 
Texaco, through the consortium, leaked oil from the pipeline, deliberately 
sprayed oil on the roads, and stored petroleum wastes in open pits.363 These 
actions led to the pollution of “the rain forests and rivers” as well as potential 
adverse health effects to residents.364 The plaintiffs sought money damages as 
well as equitable relief like funding for environmental remediation, renovating or 
closing the trans-Ecuador pipeline, establishing standards for future oil 
development, and medical monitoring.365 The court never addressed the merits of 
the complaint: after two rounds of FNC proceedings, the trial court entered 
dismissal and the Second Circuit affirmed.366 
As with the Nicaraguan DBCP cases, Aguinda did not die following 
dismissal but was refiled in Ecuador in 2003.367 The suit went to trial under 
Article 43 of an Ecuadoran law, legislation drafted and procured by Bonifaz and 
other plaintiffs’ lawyers that was enacted in 1999.368 Like Special Law 364, 
Article 43 provided the Ecuadorean courts with a vehicle to handle the 
 




362. Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 473. Another lawsuit was consolidated with Aguinda. Id. (citing Jota v. 
Texaco, Inc., Dkt. No. 94 Civ. 9266 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 28, 1994)). Peruvians living downstream also brought 
actions against Texaco that were consolidated with Aguinda. Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 536–37 (citing 
Ashanga v. Texaco, Inc., 94 Civ. 9266). 
363. 142 F. Supp. 2d 534; see Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 597. 
364. Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 473. 
365. Id. at 473–74. 
366. Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 538 (citing Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), 
reconsid. denied, 175 F.R.D. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998)); 142 
F. Supp. 2d at 536, aff’d 303 F.3d at 472. 
367. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 600. 
368. Id. 
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complicated case and the plaintiffs with a shot to recover billions in damages.369 
Rather than a class action, it proceeded as something analogous to a citizen’s 
attorney general suit, with the same named plaintiffs pursuing damages for 
environmental remediation on behalf of Ecuador as well as compensation for 
medical treatment.370 The defendant also changed: Chevron had acquired Texaco 
in 2001, and the latter remains a wholly-owned subsidiary of Chevron.371 The 
court-appointed neutral expert opined that the court should award $27 billion 
(US) damages; the trial court instead entered judgment for approximately $8.6 
billion, a figure that was doubled to $17.2 billion when Chevron declined to 
apologize within two weeks of the judgment, as well as costs to the Amazon 
Defense Front to administer the proceeds.372 Of note, the lion’s share of this 
judgment goes directly to the government of Ecuador for remediation of 
groundwater, drinking water, and soil, as well as damages to flora and fauna and 
delivery of health care.373 
2. Chevron Seeks Preemptive Nonrecognition and a Worldwide Injunction, 
Which the District Court Grants in Chevron Corp. v. Donziger 
Chevron responded by itself filing a preemptive suit in the Southern District 
of New York against the plaintiffs and their attorneys, alleging claims under the 
Racketeering Included and Corrupt Practices Act; state tort claims including 
fraud; state claims for civil conspiracy; violations of the New York Judiciary 
Law by Donziger and his law firm; and “a declaratory judgment, pursuant to the 
federal Declaratory Judgment Act, that the Lago Agrio judgment is not entitled to 
recognition or enforcement in the United States or anywhere else.”374 Based on 
outtakes from the movie Crude and computer files belonging to plaintiff’s 
attorney Stephen Donziger that were gained from the Section 1782 actions, 
Chevron sought a preliminary injunction to prevent plaintiffs and their attorneys 
from having the judgment enforced anywhere in the world.375 
In the Second Circuit, “[a] party seeking a preliminary injunction must 
establish irreparable harm and either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or 
(b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships 
tipping decidedly in its favor.”376 Judge Lewis A. Kaplan found that Chevron 
 
369. Id. at 599–600; see Drimmer & Lamoree, supra note 11, at 502–03. 
370. See Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 600, 645. 
371. Id. at 594 n.2. 
372. Id. at 603 n.60, 620–21.  
373. Id. at 621. 
374. Id. at 625–26. 
375. Id. at 594–95; Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 234; see id. at 236–37 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1782). 
376. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 626 (quoting Kamerling v. Massanari, 295 F.3d 206, 214 (2d Cir. 
2002)). 
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satisfied this standard.377 As to the immediate and irreparable injury, plaintiffs had 
a worldwide strategy of pursuing multiple enforcement actions and asset 
seizures, many of them ex parte.378 Statements by Donziger and the “Invictus” 
memorandum prepared by the Patton Boggs law firm revealed that the plaintiffs 
considered Chevron’s size its weakness.379 It operates in over one hundred 
countries and has tankers that dock around the world, including in countries that 
would be sympathetic to the plaintiffs.380 By attaching ships and seeking 
enforcement, they could disrupt Chevron’s logistics and harass Chevron into 
settling quickly rather than fighting a lengthy enforcement action in the U.S.381 
Plus, given that the plaintiffs are indigenous peoples in Ecuador, Chevron would 
not be able to recover anything it paid if it were to prevail in the lawsuit.382 
Plaintiffs have declined to stipulate that they will not seek enforcement while 
Chevron’s action is pending.383 
Judge Kaplan also found that Chevron would likely succeed on the merits of 
its claims, namely that it could win a declaratory judgment that the foreign 
judgment is not entitled to recognition and enforcement under New York’s 
Recognition Act, which follows the 1962 Recognition Act with minor 
differences.384 Chevron argued two grounds for nonrecognition: systemic 
inadequacy and fraud.385 While bound to apply New York law under the Erie 
doctrine, Judge Kaplan noted that these two grounds are part of the Uniform 
Recognition Acts adopted in most states and has been recognized in Hilton v. 
Guyot and in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law.386 
Judge Kaplan addressed the mandatory systemic inadequacy ground first.387 
Based in part on the expert report of Vladimiro Alvarez Grau, an attorney from 
Ecuador who has held numerous elected and appointed public offices and legal 
academic positions, he concluded that “[t]he Ecuadorian judiciary has been in a 
state of severe institutional crisis for some time. Matters have deteriorated 
recently.”388 Since the election of President Rafael Correa, the appointment and 
removal of judges has been through political rather than constitutional means.389 
 
377. Id. at 592, 660. 
378. Id. 
379. Id. at 623. 
380. Id.  
381. Id. at 626–27. 
382. Id. at 627. 
383. Id. at 631; see Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11 Civ 0691 (LAK), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107693 
* 101–02 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2012) (confirming that plaintiffs have made no meaningful statements that they 
will not seek recognition and enforcement). 
384. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 636, 637 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5301 et seq.). 
385. Id. at 632–33. 
386. Id.  
387. Id. at 632. 
388. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 616, 616 n.163. 
389. Id. at 617. 
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In a number of recent cases, “judges have been threatened with violence, 
removed, and/or prosecuted when they ruled against the government’s 
interests.”390 Public officials within Ecuador and numerous independent 
commentators have concluded “that the rule of law is not respected in Ecuador in 
cases that have become politicized.”391 And this case has become politicized: after 
meeting with Donziger, President Correa visited the trial proceedings and 
publicly announced his support of the plaintiffs.392 
Other sources of evidence were the reports of government and non-
governmental organizations.393 The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators showed that in 2009 Ecuador ranked in the bottom of the world with 
respect to rule of law, behind even Liberia and North Korea.394 The State 
Department’s Country Reports for the prior three years also showed that 
Ecuadoran judges sometimes decided cases in response to outside pressure and 
corruption.395 Judge Kaplan concluded that “there is abundant evidence before the 
Court that Ecuador has not provided impartial tribunals or procedures compatible 
with due process of law, at least in the time period relevant here, especially in 
cases such as this.”396 
Judge Kaplan also found that Chevron would likely be able to prove fraud in 
the Ecuadoran proceedings.397 Of most significance, counsel for plaintiffs met 
with the supposedly independent expert Cabrera before his appointment by the 
court, made illicit payments to him, and ghost-wrote some if not all of his 
damages assessment report.398  They did not notify the court of their involvement 
and made misrepresentations about their relationship to the court.399 When the 
Section 1782 proceedings threatened to reveal the relationship, they undertook to 
“cleanse” the Cabrera report by hiring new consultants who wrote a new 
assessment—based on the initial Cabrera report.400 Based on these findings, Judge 
Kaplan entered the worldwide anti-enforcement preliminary injunction requested 
by Chevron.401 
 
390. Id. at 618. 
391. Id. at 619. 
392. E.g., Drimmer & Lamoree, supra note 11, at 507–08. Other evidence of political pressure includes 
criminal charges that were brought, dropped, and then re-initiated against Chevron’s local counsel in Ecuador. 
Id. at 508. 
393. See Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 620. 
394. Id. 
395. Id. 
396. Id. at 633. 
397. Id. at 635–36 
398. Id. at 636. 
399. Id. 
400. Id. 
401. Id. at 660. Whether Chevron would be able to prevail also depended upon whether the court had 
personal jurisdiction over the plaintiffs and their counsel. Id. at 639. Judge Kaplan found that minimum contacts 
was satisfied because the plaintiffs had previously filed suit in New York after retaining New York attorneys, 
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3. The Second Circuit Reverses in Chevron Corp. v. Camacho Naranjo, 
Rejecting Preemptive Nonrecognition Under the Recognition Act 
The Second Circuit reversed and dismissed the injunction.402 The court 
nowhere addressed the findings of systemic inadequacy or fraud except in the 
occasional footnote; rather, it held that “[j]udgment-debtors can challenge a 
foreign judgment’s validity under the Recognition Act only defensively, in 
response to an attempted enforcement.”403 The court wrote: 
Whatever the merits of Chevron’s complaints about the Ecuadorian courts, 
however, the procedural device it has chosen to present those claims is simply 
unavailable: The Recognition Act nowhere authorizes a court to declare a foreign 
judgment unenforceable on the preemptive suit of a putative judgment-debtor. 
The structure of the Act is clear. The sections on which Chevron relies provide 
exceptions from the circumstances in which a holder of a foreign judgment can 
obtain enforcement of that judgment in New York; they do not create an 
affirmative cause of action to declare foreign judgments void and enjoin their 
enforcement.404 
The court cited cases applying New York and other states’ recognition acts 
and noted that nearly every one of them addressed the systemic inadequacy and 
fraud grounds only when raised by judgment-debtors as affirmative defenses.405 
Its own research revealed only one case in which a judgment-debtor was allowed 
to use the Recognition Act preemptively: Shell Oil Co. v. Franco.406 In that case, 
Shell sought a declaratory judgment that a Nicaraguan DBCP judgment against it 
was unenforceable.407 During the proceedings in Nicaragua, plaintiffs mistakenly 
sued the distinct entity the Shell Chemical Company instead of the Shell Oil 
Company. The district court for the Central District of California granted the 
injunction on the ground that the Nicaraguan court lacked personal jurisdiction 
 
and they were also subject to New York jurisdiction because of the connections of their agent, Donziger, 
himself a New York attorney. Id. at 639–44. He also balanced the factors of fair play and substantial justice and 
found that jurisdiction over the plaintiffs and their attorneys was reasonable. Id. at 644–45. The court also 
rejected a number of other arguments raised by plaintiffs and their counsel, such as whether an injunction under 
the Declaratory Judgment Act is allowed. Id. at 637–38. 
402. Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 234. 
403. Id. 
404. Id. at 240. 
405. Id. at 240, 240 n.12 (citing Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (S.D.Fla. 2009) 
(Nicaragua); Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 461 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2006) (Congo); Soc’y of Loyd’s 
v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2000) (England); Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 45 F. Supp. 2d 276 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (Liberia); S.C. Chimexim S.A. v. Velco Enters, Ltd., 36 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(Romania); Bank Melli v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406 (58 F.3d 1406) (9th Cir. 1995) (Iran); Ackermann v. Levine, 
788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986) (West Germany)). 
406. Id. at 240 (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Franco, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47557, 2005 WL 6184247 (C.D. 
Cal. Nov. 10, 2005)). 
407. Id. 
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over Shell Oil.408 The Second Circuit distinguished Franco because the 
Nicaraguan plaintiffs had already and unsuccessfully sought enforcement in 
California, while the Lago Agrio plaintiffs had not sought enforcement 
anywhere.409 
The Second Circuit then went on to hold that it declined to follow Franco to 
the extent that it supports the proposition that the Recognition Act can be used 
preemptively.410 “Challenges to the validity of foreign judgments under the 
Recognition Act can occur only after a bona fide judgment-creditor seeks 
enforcement in an ‘action on the judgment, a motion for summary judgment in 
lieu of complaint, or in a pending action by counterclaim, cross-claim or 
affirmative defense,’ and not before.”411 To allow otherwise would contravene the 
policy behind the Recognition Act and the common law principles behind it, 
which are to provide for the “generous” enforcement of foreign judgments.412 The 
court concluded that there was “no legal basis for the injunction that Chevron 
seeks, and, on these facts, there will be no such basis until judgment-creditors 
affirmatively seek to enforce their judgment in a court governed by New York or 
similar law.”413 
The court rejected other reasons for upholding the preemptive use of New 
York’s Recognition Act.414 The parties had argued over whether considerations of 
international comity weighed in favor of or against the injunction.415 Because the 
availability of an anti-enforcement injunction was governed by the Recognition 
Act, which the court had held does not allow for such injunctions, the Second 
Circuit found that “the injunction collapses before we reach issues of 
international comity.”416 Another reason was that the DJA is “procedural only” 
and does not provide a court discretion to declare rights that do not exist under 
the law.417 Because the Recognition Act could not provide a legal predicate, the 
DJA did not provide authority for issuing the injunction.418 The court found few 
cases where the DJA and the Recognition Act were used together, and “none in 
which a court undertook to use the DJA to declare the unenforceability of a 
foreign judgment before the putative judgment-creditor could seek it.”419 The 
Second Circuit found that the better approach was for Chevron to present its 
 
408. Id.; Franco, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47557 at *2. 
409. Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 240. 
410. Id. at 241. 
411. Id. (quoting N.Y. C.L.P.R. § 5303). 
412. Id. (citing Galliano, S.A. v. Stallion, Inc., 15 N.Y.3d 75, 80 (2010)). 
413. Id. at 242. 
414. See id. at 243. 
415. Id. (citing Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 646–48). 
416. Id. at 244. 
417. Id. at 244. 
418. Id. at 244–45. 
419. Id. at 245. 
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defense to recognition and enforcement if and when the Lago Agrio plaintiffs 
seek enforcement in New York.420 The case was remanded, and, except for the 
DJA claim, Chevron’s suit continues as of the writing of this Article.421 
4. Rhetorical Analysis: Avoidance and Obfuscation 
The appellate opinion directs the attention toward its preferred outcome: with 
no authority to support preemptive nonrecognition, the policy of the Recognition 
Act mandates only a defensive use. The rhetorical critic recognizes that, in 
directing the attention toward this result, the Second Circuit also deflects 
attention away from other possibilities by ignoring authority that has recognized 
the potential for preemptive nonrecognition—which in several cases has been 
granted.422 If a statutory provision has been interpreted one way by courts in the 
system, then it needs to be interpreted the same way by other courts in that 
system.423 A number of federal courts have allowed preemptive nonrecognition 
based on readings of similar Recognition Acts, even saying that the state’s 
Recognition Act does not apply to certain judgments.424 For the Second Circuit’s 
interpretation to be valid, it needs to demonstrate that its result is consistent with 
these opinions rather than ignore them.425 Instead, it distinguishes only one case 
through a misreading, Franco, before turning to a construction of the New York 
Recognition Act based on policy rather than statutory text.426 Rather than engage 
the controlling law itself—which would reveal a result contrary to its holding—
the court avoids it.427 By avoiding relevant precedent and obfuscating the 
statutory text, the court calls the integrity and legitimacy of this opinion’s 
adherence to the rule of law into doubt.428 
The Second Circuit characterizes Chevron’s action for preemptive 
nonrecognition as something so novel that there is little authority on point.429 As 
discussed above, however, at least two commentators have addressed preemptive 
nonrecognition. One devoted an entire section to this issue, stating that it was 
merely “not clear whether the scope of the Recognition Act is specifically 
limited to claims of enforcement and recognition or if it also includes the 
 
420. Id. at 246 (citing Basic v. Fitzroy Eng’g, Ltd., 949 F. Supp. 1333, 1341 (N.D. Ill. 1996)). 
421. See Steven Mufson, How Patton Boggs Got Mired in an Epic Legal Battle with Chevron over Jungle 
Oil Pits, WASHINGTON POST (June 29, 2013) (profiling how the district court has allowed Chevron discovery 
into the allegedly improper acts of another of plaintiffs’ attorneys, the Patton Boggs firm). 
422. See supra notes 81–89 and accompanying text. 
423. See supra notes 66–72 and accompanying text. 
424. See supra notes 132–37 and accompanying text. 
425. See id. 
426. See supra notes 394–97 and accompanying text. 
427. Id. 
428. See supra notes 56–61 and accompanying text. 
429. See supra note 403 and accompanying text. 
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declaratory judgment proceedings that seek to render a [foreign money judgment] 
unenforceable.”430 After all, the Recognition Acts themselves say nothing about 
declaratory judgments.431 The other commentator questioned whether Yahoo!’s 
attempt at preemptive nonrecognition was “the vanguard of a new trend or an 
exceptional kamikaze mission.”432 The answer is something in between, with at 
least seven instances—eight if you include Chevron—since 1995 in which 
judgment creditors sought to preempt enforcement of the foreign judgment 
against them, and prevailed in a few of those cases.433 
The Second Circuit claimed that “research has discovered only one out-of-
circuit district court case that has allowed a judgment-debtor to use the 
Recognition Act to make such a preemptive declaration,” which was Franco.434 
Unless the court used ridiculously precise and restrictive search terms, there is no 
explanation for failing to uncover a case like Investorshub.com, where the district 
court granted an injunction against US enforcement in a DJA suit brought by the 
judgment debtor.435 Not much research is needed to find Matusevitch—which is 
featured in at least two transnational litigation casebooks and is cited in eighty-
three law review articles—in which the district court refused recognition to a 
foreign judgment based on a suit brought by the judgment debtor.436 The Second 
Circuit could have drawn noteworthy distinctions between those cases and the 
instant one, such as the stipulation to nonrecognition in the U.S. in Investorshub 
or the earlier procedurally improper attempt by the judgment debtor in 
Matusevitch to enforce, or that neither opinion addressed specifically whether 
preemptive nonrecognition was allowed under the state’s Recognition Act.437 
Because the court did not discuss or even locate those cases—which this author 
found in a half-hour of playing with different search term combinations on 
Lexis438—it creates the impression that Chevron’s claim was not given due 
consideration. 
The court put another unnecessary limitation on the cases it considered: only 
those where the injunction was granted. In cases like Ehrenfeld and Drake, the 
claimants’ lack of success had nothing to do with the inapplicability of the 
 
430. Luthin, supra note 2, at 134 (emphasis added). 
431. Id. 
432. Gul, supra note 5, at 97. 
433. Yahoo! v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2006); Investorshub.com, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87566; Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23423 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 
2006); Franco, 2005 WL 6184247 at *2; Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1995); Drake v. 
Brady, 2009 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1049 at *1–2 (Sept. 15, 2009). 
434. Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 240. 
435. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87566. 
436. 877 F. Supp. 1, 2; BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 1136–38; THOMAS E. CHARBONNEAU, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 327–31 (2005). 
437. See supra notes 131–33, 418–19 and accompanying text. 
438. Investorshub, Yahoo!, Matusevitch, and Drake were found with searches like [nonrecogni! /s 
procedure and foreign / s money /s judgment] and [foreign / s money /s judgment /p declaratory /s judgment]. 
01_TODD_VER_8-29-13_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/2014 2:58 PM 
2013 / The Rhetoric of Recognition 
260 
Recognition Act but related to other reasons like lack of personal jurisdiction 
over the judgment creditor or the debtor’s failure to cite authority supporting the 
grounds for nonrecognition.439 Yahoo! is particularly instructive because three of 
the eleven judges held that the California Recognition Act did not even apply, 
and an additional five judges implicitly agreed because they would have allowed 
the district court to enter an injunction in favor of the plaintiff/judgment 
creditor.440 Again, Yahoo! is distinguishable because the Act did not apply since 
the French judgment was an injunction rather than a money judgment.441 But the 
rationale is one that provides guidance: some judgments may not fall within the 
scope of the Recognition Act, thus allowing judgment creditors in a DJA action 
to secure an injunction based on considerations of comity.442 
While courts wish to avoid ambiguity, it arises at strategic spots, so courts 
must sometimes distinguish contrary authority. Thus, the Second Circuit cannot 
avoid factually and procedurally similar Franco, where a multinational 
corporation sought a preliminary injunction under the DJA against Latin 
American judgment creditors,443 but the Second Circuit’s cramped reading of that 
opinion suggests that there is no substantive difference between that case and 
this. The court wrote that the district court in that case granted the injunction 
after “deeming the plaintiffs’ first failed attempt at enforcement sufficient to 
trigger the nonrecognition exceptions of California’s Recognition Act.”444 The 
first failed attempt at nonrecognition was but one factor the Franco court 
considered.445 It noted the size of the judgment was “in excess of $480 million.”446 
It also pointed out that the judgment creditors had not explained why they would 
not seek a second attempt at enforcement, “nor have they disclaimed an intent to 
seek enforcement against Shell Oil.”447 The Lago Agrio plaintiffs likewise have a 
large judgment (ten times the half-billion-dollar award in Franco); they have 
refused to stipulate that they will not seek enforcement during the pendency of 
the proceedings in New York; and the evidence before Judge Kaplan shows that 
they do plan to seek immediate enforcement—just not in New York.448 Making 
distinctions on frivolous differences suggests a lack of impartiality.449 
 
439. See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text.  
440. See supra notes 125–29 and accompanying text. 
441. Id. 
442. Id. 
443. 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47557 at *6–13. 
444. 667 F.3d at 240 (citing Franco, 2005 WL 6184247 at *4). 
445. 2005 WL 6184247 at *4. 
446. Id. 
447. 2005 WL 6184247 at *4. 
448. See supra Part IV.B. 
449. MacCormick, supra note 15, at 143. 
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MacCormick writes that justice requires that cases should be decided like 
previous cases that are relevant;450 indeed, cases that differ in their relevant facts 
need not be cited because they are not even precedent.451 Rather than address the 
preemptive nonrecognition opinions (except for Franco), the Second Circuit 
cited several others to support its assertion that the proper procedure is for a 
judgment creditor to seek enforcement first and then for the judgment debtor to 
challenge it by affirmative defense.452 While it is true that the parties in those 
cases happened to follow that procedure, none of those opinions addressed 
whether or not the given state’s Recognition Act mandated it. All the Second 
Circuit did was note the typical process for enforcing foreign money judgments; 
that does not mean it is the only way that the Recognition Act applies.453 Indeed, 
the Recognition Act comes into play in other procedural contexts, such as when 
the judgment creditor is sued and seeks recognition of the foreign money 
judgment for collateral estoppel or res judicata purposes.454 These opinions where 
the Recognition Act was raised in a typical proceeding are therefore irrelevant to 
the issue.455 
Another problem was how the court approached interpretation of the 
Recognition Act itself. In other cases where the party challenges not just the 
application to the evidence but the interpretation of the Recognition Act, the 
judges quote entire portions of the statute and engage in a lengthy analysis of the 
specific terms.456 The Second Circuit instead leads and closes with the policy of 
the New York Recognition Act: because it was meant to ensure that New York 
fora remain “generous” for foreign judgments, the grounds for nonrecognition 
can be raised defensively only, so the approach in Franco is not permitted.457 Yet 
policy should bolster rather than substitute for a reading of the statutory text 
 
450. See id.; supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text.. 
451. Todd, supra note 20, at 75. 
452. 667 F.3d at 240 n.12. 
453. Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1213 (“In a typical enforcement case, the party in whose favor the foreign 
judgment was granted comes to an American court affirmatively seeking enforcement. . . . However, this is not 
the typical case, for the successful plaintiffs in the French court do not seek enforcement. Rather, Yahoo!, the 
unsuccessful defendant in France, seeks a declaratory judgment that the French court’ interim orders are 
unenforceable anywhere in this country.”). 
454. See, e.g., Southwest Livestock and Trucking Co., Inc. v. Ramon, 169 F.3d 317, 318–20 (5th Cir. 
1999) (reversing trial court’s determination that Mexican judgment was not entitled to recognition as defense 
against judgment debtors’ action against lender for violation of Texas usury laws and RICO); RESTATEMENT 
(3D) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481 cmt. b. 
455. That it relied on this and other merely persuasive authority to support its conclusions counters any 
argument that the court was not bound to cite authority from outside the Second Circuit and New York State, 
because then ignoring contrary but relevant extrajudicial authority only magnifies the perception of bias. See 
Aldisert, supra note 18, at 632–33 (distinguishing precedent from persuasive authority).  
456. See, e.g., Soc’y of Lloyds, 233 F.3d at 481–82 (interpreting the Illinois Recognition Act as allowing a 
single procedure for recognizing and enforcing a foreign money judgment); Southwest Livestock and Trucking 
Co., Inc., 169 F.3d at 320–23, 320 n.2 (quoting the grounds for nonrecognition and then explicating the 
meaning of “cause of action” in the public policy ground). 
457. Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 239, 241. 
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itself. As MacCormick writes, judges often allude to justice or public policy as a 
criterion of evaluation.458 Such an appeal “seems conclusory rather than 
argumentative. It states the result of an evaluation without showing the working 
of it.”459 Professor Little characterized such abdication to higher authority, that 
the result is mandated by the state, as an avoidance strategy.460 
When applying a statute, the courts must interpret its terms, and reasons 
should be given for preferred interpretations that are decisive.461 The Second 
Circuit quotes only two of three relevant sections of the Act, and then only parts 
of them.462 It leads with Section 5302: “The Recognition Act supports the 
enforcement of foreign judgments that are ‘final, conclusive and enforceable 
where rendered even though an appeal therefrom is pending or it is subject to 
appeal.’”463 It then skips Section 5303, the provision dealing with recognition and 
enforcement, and moves to Section 5304, the grounds for nonrecognition.464 
Rather than quote that section, it characterizes those grounds as “exceptions”—
thus suggesting they are appropriate only in response to the judgment creditor 
first seeking recognition—and then quotes only portions of Section 5304.465 The 
court then returns to a partial quote of Section 5303 to support the policy 
argument that challenges to the validity of the judgment can be brought only after 
recognition.466 
It would be nitpicky to criticize the Second Circuit for not following to the 
letter the judicial canons of statutory construction. But in ignoring even the most 
basic rules about interpreting statutes, the court creates a perception that its 
conclusions are not based in law. Three canons are particularly relevant. First, 
courts cannot read anything out of a statute but must instead give “significance 
and effect . . . to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act.”467 Second, 
“identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the 
same meaning.”468 Finally, “courts should, if reasonably possible to do so, 
 
458. MacCormick, supra note 15, at 112. 
459. Id. 
460. Little, supra note 90, at 102–03. 
461. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text. 
462. See Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 239–41. 
463. Id. at 239. 
464. Id. 
465. Id. at 239–40. 
466. Id. at 241. 
467. 73 AM. JUR. (2D) STATUTES § 111 (“Courts, generally, in the interpretation of a statute, may not 
take, strike, or read anything out of a statute, or delete, subtract, or omit anything therefrom. To the contrary, it 
is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that significance and effect should, if possible, be accorded to every 
word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act.”); see id. at 107 (“In interpreting a statute, the court can neither insert 
language that has been left out nor omit language that has been inserted.”). 
468. Id. § 140. 
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interpret the statute or the provision being construed so as to give it efficient 
operation and effect as a whole.”469 
Applying just these three, we see that the persuasiveness of the court’s 
reasoning from policy grounds lacks authority. In quoting Section 5302, the 
Second Circuit ignored the italicized portion: “This article applies to any foreign 
country judgment which is final, conclusive and enforceable where rendered even 
though an appeal therefrom is pending or it is subject to appeal.”470 Rather than 
“support[ing] the enforcement of foreign judgments,”471 the provision actually 
narrows the scope of the Recognition Act only to certain foreign judgments: ones 
that are “final, conclusive, and enforceable.”472 The enforceability of judgments is 
not addressed until Section 5303, most of which the Second Circuit ignores: 
Except as provided in section 5304, a foreign country judgment meeting 
the requirements of section 5302 is conclusive between the parties to the 
extent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of money. Such a foreign 
judgment is enforceable by an action on the judgment, a motion for 
summary judgment in lieu of complaint, or in a pending action by 
counterclaim, cross-claim or affirmative defense.473 
Thus, only “conclusive” judgments are enforceable, and Section 5304 may 
affect whether a judgment is conclusive.474 The first mandatory ground, systemic 
inadequacy, is addressed in Section 5304(a): “No recognition. A foreign country 
judgment is not conclusive if (1) the judgment was rendered under a system 
which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the 
requirements of due process of law.”475 This section therefore specifies which 
foreign judgments are not conclusive under the Act.476 
A reading based on the full text of the relevant statutes results in an 
interpretation that could support Judge Kaplan. Because a judgment rendered 
under a system that does not provide impartial tribunals is not conclusive under 
Section 5304, it is not entitled to enforcement under Section 5303, and therefore 
the Recognition Act does not apply to it under Section 5302.477 To determine 
whether to grant the injunction, Judge Kaplan had to determine whether the Lago 
Agrio plaintiffs’ judgment was enforceable under the Recognition Act. Having 
determined that it was not conclusive and therefore not enforceable, the 
 
469. Id. § 155. 
470. N.Y. CLS CPLR § 5302 (emphasis added); Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 239.). 
471. See Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 239. 
472. N.Y. CLS CPLR § 5302. 
473. N.Y. CLS CPLR § 5303 (emphasis added). 
474. Id. 
475. Id. § 5304(a) (emphasis added).  
476. Id. 
477. See supra notes 454–460 and accompanying text. 
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Recognition Act did not apply, so he could rely upon principles of comity and the 
DJA to enter the anti-enforcement injunction.478 Referring to the policy of the 
New York Recognition Act as articulated by the courts of New York is certainly 
proper—and with a more detailed analysis might override this construction—but 
avoiding the text of the statute itself and the relevant case law calls into question 
the integrity and legitimacy of the opinion.479 
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON THE RHETORIC OF (NON)RECOGNITION 
Scholars have decried the systemic inadequacy ground, particularly as 
applied to these two cases, yet that ground had no adverse effect on the judgment 
creditors. But this rhetorical analysis has revealed that the ground did affect the 
reasoning of the appellate courts and had a negative impact on the rule of law and 
on the parties themselves. 
With such high-profile cases, both courts could have engaged in a thorough 
analysis of all the sources it considered conflicting and offered definitive judicial 
statements. The Eleventh Circuit in particular could have based its rejection of 
the systemic inadequacy finding on a Constitutional ground, the act of state 
doctrine, which has been articulated by the Supreme Court and proffered by 
scholars. Or the Eleventh Circuit might have advanced a new interpretation of the 
systemic inadequacy ground or the type and amount of evidence needed to prove 
it. In Camacho Naranjo, the Second Circuit might have cited and distinguished 
all the other cases on preemptive nonrecognition and then engaged in a thorough 
reading of the Recognition Act. 
The reason why neither court took bold action is likely because these cases 
are so high-profile, and courts prefer to avoid controversy.480 Jonathan C. 
Drimmer and Sarah R. Lamoree have detailed the political action taken by the 
parties in both the DBCP and Lago Agrio litigation, which includes the 
involvement of the governments of Nicaragua and Ecuador.481 Each country 
enacted legislation specifically in aid of the plaintiffs, and President Correa has 
come out publicly in support of the Lago Agrio plaintiffs and of enforcing the 
judgment.482 Indeed, the government of Ecuador stands to gain the most from 
successful enforcement, which provides billions in soil and water remediation yet 
imposes no liability for the actions of the state-owned Petroecuador.483 While the 
Eleventh Circuit said nothing, the Second Circuit seemed well aware of the 
 
478. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d, § II; see also Luthin, supra note 2, at 134 (“The Recognition Act. . . 
define[s] the defines scope n terms of the [foreign money judgment] itself. . . .[I]f the [foreign money judgment] 
c omports with the requirements of the Act, then it is covered by the Act.”). 
479. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text. 
480. See supra Part IV. 
481. See Drimmer, supra note 11, at 489–512. 
482. Id. 
483. See Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 353; Patel, supra note 10, at 103. 
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implications for international relations of labeling another’s country’s judiciary 
as impartial and corrupt.484 For example, it opined that allowing preemptive 
nonrecognition “would unquestionably provoke extensive friction between legal 
systems by encouraging challenges to the legitimacy of foreign courts in cases in 
which the enforceability of the foreign judgment might otherwise never be 
presented in New York.”485 It also wrote that comity cautioned against using a 
court of New York “as a transnational arbiter to dictate to the entire world which 
judgments are entitled to respect and which countries’ courts are to be treated as 
international pariahs.”486 The court did not apply the systemic inadequacy ground 
because it clearly wished to avoid doing so, and its holding therefore has 
everything to do with the ground. 
But in deferring to the governments of foreign countries, these two courts 
ignored other stakeholders in the drama, such as the states that have enacted 
recognition laws and US courts that have interpreted them. To support its 
reversal of the district court’s finding, the Eleventh Circuit would have had to 
distinguish or decline to adopt the approach in the Second, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits. To do so ignores that Florida courts have characterized the Recognition 
Acts of other states as substantially the same as Florida’s and therefore relied 
upon extrajurisdictional authority. While rhetoricians acknowledge such 
ambiguity, that other courts can and have come out differently, judges avoid it 
because they want the appearance of the right and inevitable result. Or, the court 
would have had to inject the US Constitution into this issue of state law, thus 
inviting Supreme Court review. Instead, the Eleventh Circuit avoided politics 
altogether through the distancing device of a per curiam opinion devoid of 
reference to any authority on scope of review or the soundness of the district 
court’s approach.487 
The Second Circuit likewise would have had to acknowledge that it stands 
alone in holding that the Recognition Act forbids preemptive nonrecognition if it 
had to distinguish the numerous state and federal court opinions, including the 
Ninth Circuit, that seem to allow it, so it avoided those cases altogether.488 In light 
of the controversy of this political topic, the court chose not to engage but instead 
obfuscated, clinging to vague policy rather than detailed statutory construction.489 
It abdicated to the higher authority of the New York Recognition Act without 
explicating that Act, which by its terms does not compel employing the grounds 
for nonrecognition only in defense.490 
 
484. See Camacho Naranjo, 667 F. 3d at 246. 
485. Id. 
486. Id. at 242. 
487. See generally Osorio, 635 F.3d 1277. 
488. See generally Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232. 
489. Id. 
490. Id. at 253–255. 
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These opinions also create irrational and inconsistent authority, whether 
precedential or persuasive, for future litigation. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the 
systemic inadequacy ground and the result was still the same: no recognition and 
enforcement.491 Accordingly, the holding did not change the result for these 
parties, but what about future litigants? “A reviewing court abdicates its role in 
providing future guidance where it affirms a trial court decision without 
disclosing its rationale for doing so.”492 We cannot assume that all cases arising 
from Nicaragua will be based on “legislation that de facto guarantees the denial 
of due process” and that deprives the trial court of personal and subject matter 
jurisdiction.493 For a point of law that is seldom applied, Judge Huck’s opinion 
could have had tremendous value as precedent for judgment debtors, or even as 
persuasive authority since most states have adopted either the 1962 or 2005 
Recognition Acts, both of which have the systemic inadequacy ground.494 Now, 
judgment debtors cannot cite to a thorough and well-reasoned opinion. And the 
opinion reaches beyond Nicaraguan judgments: judgment creditors from every 
nation now have authority to challenge any trial court that follows the same 
approach to systemic inadequacy as Judge Huck, even though it is the approach 
that other courts have followed. Because the Eleventh Circuit did not specify the 
error, both the interpretation of systemic inadequacy and the types and amount of 
evidence to prove it are called into question. 
The opinion also creates a problem for judgment creditors, however. Those 
from Nicaragua might request a US court to take judicial notice of the rejection 
of Judge Huck’s finding of systemic inadequacy to support the proposition that 
Nicaragua in fact has impartial tribunals. But the Eleventh Circuit did not 
substitute its own findings of fact, so there is nothing of which to take judicial 
notice.495 Further, because the court described no rules of law that controlled its 
rejection of the systemic inadequacy finding, the opinion contains no specific 
doctrine and therefore should have zero value as binding or even persuasive 
authority.496 Nor does the court’s statement satisfy the definition of dictum 
because it does not concern a rule of law or legal proposition, and it was essential 
to the determination of the case.497 With so little judicial authority on this ground, 
judgment creditors will likely cite it anyway, thus adding another conflicting 
voice to the patchwork of opinions on state recognition laws. Because this 
ground is still the law, judgment creditors from other developing nations also 
 
491. See Osorio, 635 F.3d 1277 at 1278–79. 
492. 5 AM. JUR. 2D APPELLATE REVIEW § 773. 
493. Baker & Parise, supra note 5, at 10–11. 
494. See supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text. 
495. See generally Osorio, 635 F.3d 1277 
496. Id.; Todd, supra note 20, at 78–79; Maltz, supra note 74, at 366–83. 
497. Todd, supra note 20, at 79 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 454 (6th ed. 1990) (defining dictum 
as “[s]tatements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not . . . essential 
to determination of the case.”). 
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face uncertainty, especially if they attempt to enforce in Florida or any state in 
the Eleventh Circuit, because they do not know, nor do they have a reasoned way 
of knowing, what the specific error was.498 
Because of its desire to avoid passing judgment on the Ecuadoran judiciary, 
the opinion in Camacho Naranjo likewise confuses future enforcement 
proceedings in the U.S. It deprives judgment debtors of the possibility of 
preemptive nonrecognition in the Second Circuit, and, as the only opinion that 
has squarely addressed the issue, potentially in other jurisdictions as well. Some 
state and federal courts have been receptive to preemptive nonrecognition, 
however.499 To the extent they can obtain personal jurisdiction outside the Second 
Circuit, judgment debtors will go elsewhere and challenge Camacho Naranjo 
when it is inevitably raised by the judgment creditors. Because that case did little 
to distinguish seemingly contrary authority, and because its interpretation of the 
New York Recognition Act is based on policy rather than its specific terms, 
judgment creditors might win this challenge.500 This could result in a circuit split, 
but on an issue of multiple states’ laws that the Supreme Court may be unwilling 
to review.501 
Perhaps the most glaring defect in both opinions is that it denies the rule of 
law to the parties themselves.502 Win or lose, each party comes to the court with 
the expectation that the decisions on their contested points will accord with the 
relevant legal authority and that they will be treated consistently with other 
persons who have litigated similar claims. While the outcome in Osorio would 
not change because of the other grounds for nonrecognition, the parties 
nevertheless contested one statutory ground that they developed through 
considerable evidence on both sides, for which they received a detailed 
conclusion from the district court, but which the Eleventh Circuit casually tossed 
aside.503 By declining to offer even a hint as to why, the court showed a lack of 
respect. Further, it diminished the legitimacy of the outcome: if no reason need 
be given to find a ground unsupportable, then are the reasons for the other 
grounds supportable? The parties can rightly wonder whether the judge in re-
creating the law afforded them justice when it refused to give them justifications. 
This same question arises with the parties in Camacho Naranjo.504 While the 
Second Circuit at least adopted specific doctrine and offered a rationale for its 
 
498. See MacCormick, supra note 15, at 12, 16. 
499. See supra notes 132–37 and accompanying text.  
500. See generally Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232. 
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holding,505 neither the doctrine nor rationale was reasonable because the court 
ignored or misread relevant authority and declined to examine the controlling 
authority of the New York Recognition Act. Unlike the parties in Osorio, though, 
the Second Circuit’s opinion had a practical effect on the parties: with the 
preliminary injunction against worldwide enforcement dismissed, the Lago Agrio 
plaintiffs have initiated their “Invictus” plan.506 They have already gone to the 
courts of several nations such as Canada, Brazil, Columbia, and Argentina, thus 
forcing Chevron to defend multiple enforcement actions rather than one.507 An 
Argentine trial court ordered approximately $2 billion of assets of a Chevron 
subsidiary frozen, thus disrupting Chevron’s worldwide operations.508 If the 
Second Circuit had identified and distinguished the other cases where preemptive 
nonrecognition was allowed and engaged in a more thorough analysis of the New 
York Recognition Act, then its opinion, though arguable, would be reasonable. 
Even though Chevron would never like this outcome, the court would have 
demonstrated that it had at least considered Chevron’s stance before reversing the 
injunction. Instead, Chevron can perceive that its adherence was not secured 
through reason, so the foreign enforcement proceedings and asset seizures are the 
result of a denial of justice by the courts of its own country. 
Judge Posner has written, “We should not be so naïve as to infer the nature of 
the judicial process from the rhetoric of judicial opinions.”509 Yet we can examine 
the rhetoric of judicial opinions for their impact on the integrity of the judicial 
process when well-reasoned trial court opinions are disregarded without sound 
basis—or any basis at all. 
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